Tag: State Legislature

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Guest post: Does GNCTD (Amendment) Act 2021 stand the test of our constitutional ethos?

[This is a guest post by Preetkiran Kaur who is student of RGNUL, Patiala and an editor at Constitutional Renaissance Blog.]

Introduction

The Constitution of India begins with a declaration that India is a sovereign democratic republic. This idea of vesting real sovereignty in the people of the country was adopted by the Constitution makers during the days of framing the Constitution.

The rule by the people, of the people and for the people along with a Federal Structure was propounded to establish an egalitarian social order. However, a rigid federal model could not be adopted owing to the unique challenges being faced such as building communal tensions, poor state of agriculture and farmers along with low levels of economic development at the time of independence. It was concurred that a cooperative federal model (which has been discussed on this blog, here) shall be implemented where States and Union Territories shall be given certain autonomy in terms of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Geoffrey Sawer defined cooperative federalism as:

A system of governance where ‘each of the parties to the arrangement has a reasonable degree of autonomy, can bargain about the terms of the cooperation, and at least if driven too hard, decline to cooperate.’

Thus, as KC Wheare coined, ‘a quasi-federal model’ was opted for all the states of the nation which would rely on ideas of co-operation, negotiation, statesmanship and constitutional morality. However, the unique position of Delhi as the national capital became a peculiar case of contention. Hence, The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Parent Act’) gave it the status of a union territory with a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor. It is neither completely vested with powers of a state but has more rights than a Union Territory.

Thus, Dr BR Ambedkar stated on the floor of the Constituent assembly that the Constitution is “both unitary as well as federal   according   to   the   requirement   of   time   and circumstances.”

Over the years, the interpretation of the NCT Act, 1991 has often been examined by the Courts and the landmark judgment of GNCTD v. UOI is an important one in this regard, which is summarised and discussed on this blog, here. The case settled the conflicting questions of law. However, the present Central government in the year 2021 passed the GNCTD (Amendment) Act 2021 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Act’) which usurped the powers of the Legislative Assembly and the executive of Delhi. The author thus attempts to identify certain constitutional challenges against The Amendment Act, 2021 which undermines the principles of federalism and democracy.

Scrutinising the GNCTD (Amendment) Act 2021

Section 2 of The Act amends Section 21 of The Principal Act and states that “the expression “Government” referred to in any law to be made by the Legislative Assembly shall mean the Lieutenant Governor.” This provision is in direct contradiction with the democratic ideas of representative governance followed in India. The Parliamentary system practiced in India relies on elected representatives chosen on the basis of adult suffrage. Thus, members of the Legislative assembly of Delhi elected under Article 239AA represent the popular will of the People. Sixty-Ninth Amendment was specifically brought to establish the Westminster Model in Delhi and have a democratic set up. The use of the word ‘shall’ in Article 239AA clause (2) signifies that establishing a Legislative Assembly using adult suffrage shall be a mandatory provision. The real power vests with the elected representatives or the Council of Ministers which in turn have a collective responsibility towards the State legislature to ensure accountability. J. Chandrachud in GNCTD v. UOI opines that, “Collective responsibility, as a constitutional doctrine, ensures accountability to the sovereign will of the people who elect the members of the legislature.” 

Thus, the democratic idea of representative government is robbed in a case where Lieutenant Governor would be synonymous to the government. The Lieutenant Governor is appointed by the Central government and not directly by the people. The Central government represents a very small section of the population which cannot be vested with the power to replace elected representatives with nominated heads. The Lieutenant Governor has no collective or individual responsibility to the public whereas democracy ensures direct nexus of the two. 

Second, Section 3 of The Act amends Section 24 of The Principal Act and states that any matter which does not fall under the Legislative Assembly shall fall within the powers of the Lieutenant Governor. Article 239AA (3)(a) states that the Legislative Assembly shall have the power to legislate on matters in the State Lists except on issues of police, public order and land. These subjects fall under the purview of the Central government. Vesting the power to legislate upon these subjects on a nominated head instead of an elected representative undermines the principles of electoral democracy in India. It was iterated in GNCTD v. UOI that bestowing the Center the powers which have been constitutionally provided to the states is an act against the basic tenets of democracy.

 In addition to that, Section 4 of The Act amends Section 33 of The Principal Act and states that rules of procedure for conduct of its business shall be pari materia to the Rules of House of People. In addition to that, it truncates the Legislative Assembly to frame any rules pertaining to its day to day administration and is powerless in terms of conducting enquiries. Article 239AA (3)(a) also explicitly provides the power to the Assembly to conduct its business and frame rules accordingly. 

Lastly, Section 5 of The Act amends Section 44 of The Principal Act and states that any executive action can be taken by the Legislative Assembly only after consulting the Lieutenant Governor. The term ‘aid and advise’ has been employed in the Article 239AA implies that the Council of Ministers shall aid him in performance of his duties. In addition to that, the difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and Council of Ministers shall be settled by the Lieutenant Governor only in cases where it is urgent for him to take immediate action. In the judgment of GNCTD v.UOI, the Constitutional Bench held that the phrase ’on any matter’ does not imply ‘every matter’. The primary law making power vests in the assembly and role of the Lieutenant Governor is merely that of an Administrator. 

These provisions which are in stark contradiction to the text of supreme lex, i.e. Constitution of India, and they violate the Doctrine of Pith and Substance. The Rule states that the Parliament or State Legislature shall exercise its functions as permitted by the Constitution and cannot encroach upon powers of the other. Here, the Parliament by passing the Amendment Act trespasses its domain and infringes upon the powers of the Legislative Assembly mandated by the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Limited v. State of Assam laid down a three tier test to determine the application of the doctrine. For applying the principle of “pith and substance” regard is to be had: 1. The enactment as a whole; 2. To its main objects; and, 3. To the scope and effect of its provisions.

Looking at the Amendment Act as an organic whole and examining its statement of Objects and Reasons, the intent lies to limit the powers of the Legislative Assembly by entrusting legislative powers to the Lieutenant Governor. The effect of the provisions as discussed undermine the principle of representative government and collective responsibility which form the bedrock of democracy. 

This rule of ‘pith and substance’ stems from the idea of federalism which in the case of SR Bommai v. Union of India was classified as the basic structure of our Constitution. Encyclopedia Britannica defines federalism as:

“Federalism,   mode   of   political   organization   that unites separate states or other policies within an overarching political system in such a way as to allow each to maintain its own fundamental political integrity.” 

It was held in the celebrated judgment of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be amended or abrogated. The same view was reiterated in   Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, T.N.   Seshan,   CEC   of India v. Union of India and others and Kuldip Nayar v. Union   of   India   others.

Thus, by disturbing the distribution of powers between Center and state, it becomes an imminent threat on the co-operative federalism model followed in India. The federal balance calls for division of powers between Center and states with a comparatively strong center. However, the Rule of Law does not permit arbitrary interference in the powers of the State without a legitimate cause. Center has a constitutional duty to uphold constitutional morality and cannot act based on its whims and fancies. The Apex Court in the case of In  re:   Under   Article   143, Constitution  of  India,  (Special  Reference  No.  1  of  1964) held that “the essential characteristic of federalism is the distribution   of   limited   executive,   legislative   and judicial   authority   among   bodies   which   are coordinate with and independent of each other.”

Conclusion

To sum up, the author would like to conclude that the controversial Amendment Act passed by the Parliament violates not only the spirit of the Constitution but also the basic structure. The provisions of the Constitution entail a sovereign and democratic spirit where Rule of Law shall prevail. However, as discussed in the article, the legislative intent and the legislation as a whole do not pass the test of democratic federal set up of a nation. The present legislation although received the assent of the President but should be quashed by the Apex Court to fulfil its role of a ‘Guardian’ of the Constitution.

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GNCT Delhi v. Union of India: An analysis of Dharna and Drama

[Editorial Note: The author issues a public apology for using footnotes in this blog-post as opposed to hyperlinks. This blog-post was written during lockdown 2020, which means before the recent controversial GNCTD (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was under consideration. This blog-post provides a background to the bill as the author analyses the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which will diluted if this Bill will be passed by the Parliament.]

During the year 2017-18, the people of Delhi were wretched due to ‘policy paralysis’ as there was a tussle between the Delhi Government and Lieutenant Governor of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as LG). There was dharna on one side and drama on the other; that’s how the constitutionally established political system of Delhi was ‘oozing venom’ on each other. The scuffle between the two constitutional authorities raised several legal and constitutional issues on the scope of their respective powers and limitations in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. In this blog-post, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India & Another (hereinafter referred to as the Delhi case), which answered the several questions of law with regard to Delhi, will be analysed and significance of the same would be foregrounded.

Issues

The Delhi case has its own convolution as the main issue in the case was the interpretation of Article 239AA of the Constitution which is a special provision with respect to the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The “centripodal” conundrum was with regard to the administrative powers of the LG, as to whether- (a) he is controlled by the phrase ‘aid and advise’ of the Council of Ministers (hereinafter referred to as ‘COM’) [or]; (b) his power as the administrator of NCT of Delhi remains untouched by the 69th constitutional amendment. Does the constitutional amendment give special status to NCT of Delhi among the Union Territories? Should LG be informed about every decision taken by the COM? Can the LG refer ‘every (or any) matter’ under proviso Article 239AA (4) to the President? What must be the guiding principles when there is difference of opinion between the LG and the COM? These are the few issues which were addressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The Judgment

Article 239AA of the Constitution confers special status to the NCT of Delhi. It is distinguished from Article 239 and Article 239A as the purpose of inserting this Article was to confer special status to Delhi. The batch of petitions filed before the Supreme Court sought for the judicial interpretation of mainly two clauses, that is, [i] Article 239AA (3)(a) and (b) – which states that the Legislative assembly of Delhi is empowered to make laws with respect to whole or any part of NCT of Delhi with respect to matters enumerated under List II[1] or III and the Parliament, too, will have the power to laws with respect to all the matters and; [ii] Article 239AA (4) and its proviso – which states that there shall be COMs[2] with the Chief Minister at its head to ‘aid and advise’ the LG and if there is a difference of opinion between the two, then the LG can refer the matter to the President for a decision. The judgment aims to resolve any disharmony and anarchy by making the parties realize the feeling of ‘constitutional renaissance’[3]. The purposive interpretation must be adopted to interpret Article 239AA so that the basic structure of the Constitution (i.e., Democracy and Federalism) is augmented in NCT of Delhi which will further reinforce the confidence placed by the people of Delhi in the elected-government.

  • Status of NCT of Delhi

The NCT of Delhi is neither a state nor ‘just’ a union territory, but under the constitutional scheme Delhi and other union territories are not on same pedestal.[4] Its status is unique. By the insertion of Articles 239AA and 239AB, it could be understood that the status of NCT of Delhi is sui generis and it is a class by itself. By the introduction of Westminster style cabinet system of government, the residents of Delhi have a “larger say in how Delhi is to be governed”.

  • Executive powers of COM

The conjoint reading of Article 239AA (3)(a) and Article 239AA (4) reveals that the executive power of the NCTD is coextensive with the legislative power of the NCTD which extends to all the matters in state list (except three matters) and concurrent list. Therefore, the executive power of the COM is coextensive with the legislative powers of the Assembly, so that various policies decisions are implemented smoothly. Further, the executive power of the Union government does not extend to the executive powers of the NCTD, hence, it does not have any say in the policy decision of Delhi’s COM. Only legislative power of the Parliament is conterminous to legislative power of Delhi which basically means that “nothing shall derogate the powers of Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for the Union Territory of Delhi”[5].

  • Is LG is bound by ‘aid and advise’ of COM?

Under Article 239AA(4), it is stipulated that Delhi now has a Westminster Style cabinet system of government where there ‘shall’ be COM who are responsible to the Legislative Assembly and the COM headed by the Chief Minister shall ‘aid and advise’ the LG. Therefore, the LG is bound by the aid and advise of the COM, as per Article 239AA (4) of the Constitution, only in the matters in which legislative powers has been conferred upon the Assembly (except in the matters where he has been entrusted to act in his discretion). To support this argument, the bench emphasized on section 42 of the 1991 Act which is identical to the clause (2) of the Article 74[6] which is also a manifestation that the words ‘aid and advise’ must be uniformly interpreted. Section 42 states that:

“42. Advise by Ministers. The question whether any, and if so what, advise was tendered by Ministers to the Lieutenant Governor shall not be inquired into in any court.”

Just like the aid and advise of the Union’s COM is binding on to the President, in the same way the ‘aid and advise’ of the COM of NCT of Delhi must be binding on the LG.

[On a similar note, the COMs are just required to “communicate and inform its various proposals, agendas and decisions to the LG so as to keep the LG apprised and to enable him to scrutinize the same”[7] but there is no need for a prior concurrence of the LG as it will dilute the idea of representative governance and democracy as conceived for Delhi under Article 239AA.]

However, this is subject to the proviso of Article 239AA (4) which confers upon LG the power to refer “any” matter to the President for a ‘binding decisions’, when there is a difference of opinion between LG and COM. “This proviso to clause (4) has retained the powers for the Union/ LG even over matters falling within the legislative domain of the Delhi Assembly”[8], based upon the ‘thoughtful interpretation’ of the LG. But does LG have the power to refer “every” matter to the President? This would be answered in the forthcoming section of this chapter.

  • Can the LG refer “every” matter to the President?

Although the LG is not a titular head of Delhi as rather, he has the power to exercise discretion in certain matters, unlike the President and the Governor. But the LG’s discretionary power is limited to only three matters over which the Assembly does not have any legislative powers, meaning thereby, if the COM makes any policy with regard to any matter which is outside their jurisdiction then the LG would be well within his powers to reject the policy or refer it to the President. Coming to proviso of Article 239AA (4), the term “any” cannot be construed neither broadly, to include every matter, nor narrowly, as argued by the petitioners, rather it must be interpreted in a way where the phrase is workable and the constitutional balance is maintained. The word ‘any’ is unlikely to mean anything under the sun and it must have a limitation on it which must be determined by the context in which it is used.[9] The Court held that the word used in the proviso cannot be construed as ‘every matter’ and it must be interpreted in a manner so as to ‘deduce the real intention of the Parliament’ and the purpose for/in which the word has been used. The Court went further to hold that the rule under the proviso is an exception and not the general norm (Paragraph 233). The LG must act with constitutional objectivity and must be guided by constitutional morality as ‘constitutional trust’ has been reposed in his office. The LG must not refer every matter to the President (‘in mechanical or routine manner’) as it would fail the idea of representative governance and democracy and it must not be taken as if the LG has a “right to differ” from the COMs.

Furthermore, the COM must adhere to the 1991 Act and the rules made therein, hence, the LG ‘must be apprised with every decision taken by the COM’ (Paragraph 233). The LG can differ from the decision of the COMs but, first, the efforts must be made to resolve the conflicts. In case of a difference between the LG and a particular minister, the matter must be referred to the Council; then, if the difference persists, then the matter must be referred to the President. (Here the reference must be made to Rule 49[10] and Rule 50[11] of The Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993)

CJI Misra demonstrated the role of the LG and COM as (Paragraph 236):

“There should   not   be   exposition   of   the   phenomenon   of   an obstructionist but reflection of the philosophy of affirmative constructionism and a visionary. The constitutional amendment does not perceive a situation of constant friction and difference which gradually builds a structure of conflict. At the same time, the Council of Ministers being headed by the Chief Minister should be guided by values and prudence accepting the constitutional position that the NCT of Delhi is not a State.”

Therefore, before making any reference to the President under the proviso, the 1993 Rules must be followed and there must be dialogue and discussions between the COM and LG to resolve the differences. In the words of Justice D Y Chandrachud, “a reference to the President is contemplated by the Rules only when the above modalities fail to yield a solution, when the matter may be escalated to the President” (page 411, Paragraph M (19)). Henceforth, the LG must not have a hostile attitude towards COMs and Chief Minister, rather he should act as a facilitator, “keeping in mind the standards of constitutional trust and morality, the principle of collaborative federalism and constitutional   balance, the concept of constitutional governance and objectivity and  the nurtured and cultivated idea of respect for a representative government” (page 232, Paragraph xviii).

Significance of the Judgment

In Delhi’s case, the Supreme Court declined to lay down an ‘exhaustive’ list where the LG may choose to refer the matter to the President. Rather Justice Chandrachud’s concurring opinion laid down a broader rubric of “national concerns”, where the reference to the President can be made, which is not addressed by the majority judgment. This simply means that LG can refer the matter when the Delhi government touch upon the ‘legitimate interest’ of the Union Government (as it is physically based in Delhi). One example: opening of Mohalla Clinics (by Delhi Government) will not come under “national concerns”, and therefore it is not in the scope of proviso.

With regard to Article 239AA (4) proviso, there is no specificity in the majority judgment as to what could be referred to the President. This could be “ameliorated” by Justice Chandrachud’s concurring opinion. Although the disputes between the Delhi Government and Union are purely “political” in nature, but in such cases, constitutional doctrines and principles can help to resolve the disputes.

Even after this judgment, recently during the COVID-19 crisis, the LG (as Chairperson of Delhi Disaster Management Authority) reversed the decision of the Delhi Government, in which the Government reserved the hospital beds for residents of Delhi only. Although the order passed by the Delhi Government was contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution as it threatens the life of the individuals who are not residents of Delhi, but still ‘reversing’ of the decision of the Delhi Government is contrary to the Delhi’s case and the principles laid down therein. The LG can disagree and refer the matter to the President, but can he just overrule the decision taken by the duly elected government? The new Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2021 makes it possible. Will it held unconstitutional by the apex court? The question remains.

[1] Article 239AA (3)(a)- “The legislative assembly shall have power to make laws…… with respect to state list or concurrent in so far as any such matter is applicable to Union territories except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State list and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2, and 18.”

[2] COMs to be not more than ten percent of the total number of members in the Delhi Legislative Assembly.

[3] By Constitutional renaissance, CJI Misra meant, “true blossoming of the constitutional ideals, realization and acceptance of constitutional responsibility within the boundaries of expression and silences and sincerely accepting the summon to be obeisant to the constitutional conscience with a sense of reawakening to the constitutional vision” (The Delhi Case at pp. 220-221, Paragraph 275)

[4] New Delhi Municipal Corporation v. State of Punjab, (1997) 7 S.C.C. 339.

[5] Article 239AA(3)(b)

[6] Article 74, Clause 2: “The question whether any, and if so what, advise was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court”.

[7] As per, The Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993, which are framed by the President in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Section 44 of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991.

[8] The Delhi Case at pp.161-162, Paragraph 195.

[9] J.L. Austin, How to do Things with Words, The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University, 1955.

[10]  Rule 49 of T.B.G.N.C.T.D Rules, 1993: In case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister in regard to any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall endeavour by discussion   on   the   matter   to   settle   any   point   on which such difference of opinion has arisen. Should the   difference   of   opinion   persist, the   Lieutenant Governor may direct that the matter be referred to the Council.

[11] Rule 49 of T.B.G.N.C.T.D Rules, 1993: In case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council with regard to any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall refer it to the   Central   Government   for   the   decision   of   the President and shall act according to the decision of the President.

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Case Study on State Assemblies of North East India: Need for Reservations for Women

[Editorial Note: Constitutional Renaissance’s Research on State assemblies of North East can be accessed here]

In this article, we conducted a research on the incumbent Members of Legislative Assembly (‘MLAs’) in eight states of North East (Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Meghalaya and Nagaland) as a sample data to analyse the number of women MLA in these regions, their family backgrounds, political parties and their income, whether they are from a relatively poor or rich background (click here to see our summarised research). This research tries to answer the question “whether women are proportionally represented in the State Assemblies according to their population in the state.” As the Tribune reports, ‘the Perception of Electoral Integrity Index gave India 40/100, under the Varieties of Democracy’s Female Rights Index, with India performing its lowest in political power. In the EIU’s Democracy Index (2019), India suffered a downfall in political participation from 7.22 to 6.67.’ Currently, in-state assembly elections, there is no proportional reservation for women, unlike in the third tier of government (Panchayats) where we have 33% reservation for women. Through this research, we will be proposing that there is a requirement for proportional reservation for women in the state assemblies and in Parliament to avoid ‘political lockout’ and to keep our democracy legitimate.

Liberal Constitution and ‘political lockout’

In liberal constitutions, like that of India, the state has an indispensable duty to protect the rights of the citizens and to ensure that the freedoms and civil liberties are not compromised at any cost. Although the denial of these civil liberties presents many stability problems for democracy. But ‘political lockout’ of a section of society out of power raises concerns with regard to the whole legitimacy of the democracy. That section of society could be Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes or women as well. In the words of Tarunabh Khaitan, political lockout means ‘when a group comprehensively loses any genuine prospects of garnering even a threshold level of political power at least some of the time, it has been ‘locked out’ of power’. We have always thought of political representation debate with regard to caste and religion. But keeping a whole group, which is women, out of politics may also repose serious threat to the legitimacy of the liberal order established by the Constitution. For instance, if a particular group is kept out of power for long and they are refused to participate in decisions which affect their lives, then that group will lose faith in the democracy as their interests are not fulfilled either represented in the law-making body. We have seen in the past when committees are formed for a particular purpose but they keep out a section of a society which are the most affected section, then it raises alarming concerns about that committee, to an extend delegitimizing it (for instance, see this). Through our research, we have found that women in north-east have been kept out of power for some time and they have been denied equal participation in the law-making process. In the northeast alone, out of 498 seats (MLAs) spread over eight different states, there are only 24 elected women representatives.

The research displays a lot of flustering concerns: about the legitimacy of democracy. Scholar Choudhary argues in his book that

‘the ambition of liberal constitutionalism is that a constitutional order must both be legitimate and must enjoy the allegiance of a sufficient number of its citizens.’

If a group, be it, women, any caste, any class, is kept out of power for some time then ‘that has the capacity to destabilise the constitutional settlement’. Through our research, we saw that the women who are in politics, and who become MLAs, are relatively richer to those women who do not get into politics. The data shows that all of the women MLAs who get elected are relatively richer with assets ranging from Rs. 1,49,77,798 (of a member from Tripura) to Rs. 1,86,28,851 (of a member from Assam). The plight of a woman who is not relatively rich and is not represented in the law-making process is so much that it might make the state assemblies illegitimate and no longer liberal as it does not represent democracy, rather a ‘plutocracy’. Plutocracy is a society that is ruled or controlled by people of great wealth or income. A majority group, who is relatively poor, is kept out of power.

Research shows us that there are no single women in all the states who are ‘relatively poor’ as compared to others. The MLA with the lowest income among all of them is from Tripura (CPI(M) party) who has assets worth Rs. 7,05,142 (But we never know if this has increased after getting elected as an MLA). If a set of group, which has a defining characteristic that is relatively poor and not-men, is kept out of political power (even the minimum share of power), then ‘the guarantee of fair political opportunity has been compromised’ (see Tarun Khaitan’s research). If need to make a democracy legitimate of authority beyond the formal declaration of ‘free and fair elections’, we must address the issues of ‘political lockout’, under-representation and every group must get a chance to represent itself in the position of power.

As Geetika Dang, Research analyst from Brookings India put it ‘while Mizoram has never elected a female member Parliament [as also shown through our research even in the case of state assemblies], perhaps the starkest example of the lack of female representation comes from Nagaland that has failed to elect a single female MLA in 55 years of statehood. Rano Shaiza, a member of United Democratic Party, was the first and only woman in this state who was elected to Lok Sabha in 1977.’ Our research shows that currently in Mizoram and Nagaland there are no women MLAs in an area where the population of women is 5.41 lakhs and 9.53 lakhs respectively. There is no state in North East India which does not regularly make laws for women but the voices of the women are not heard in the halls of the legislature as there is no one to represent them. Further, the data from Manipur raises more alarming concerns as for 14.17 lakhs women, there is only one MLA.

We also found something interesting that out of these total 24 elected MLAs in the North East region, only 4 of them have some kind of political background. Rest of them did not have any sort of political background, neither their husbands nor their parents are in politics. This shows a positive trend that women are becoming independent and without any political support, they are standing up and coming into a profession which is termed as ‘dirty’ in common parlance (but we are not sure about their political connection through other connections).

Although, it is true that every woman in North-East have a right to vote guaranteed by the Constitution, but just formal declaration of equality cannot justify the inequality faced by women in the law-making process (or even in their share of political power). Hence, there is a need for a minimum reservation of seats for women in the legislative assemblies.

 Answering the ‘inequality’ in Representation: A ‘Localised’ Solution?

One of the methods to ensure women representation in North-East region is by making sure all the women come together to support other women, basically lobby the support. This needs to be done through the Gandhian methods of localising the issues and answering them through a bottoms-up approach. As Simi Malhotra, Director of the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, Jamia Millia Islamia, said in a Development Seminar in 2019 that, “the paternalistic baggage of ethnicity, and hence the ethnic divide within the northeastern states, has been an impediment in this direction.  At the grassroots level, the women’s movement in the northeast and associated synergies and outlets of solidarity have to be explored.” But this casts another issue which is inevitable that only those women who are relatively richer will be able to organise women and get the support like how we see in national politics. Even the first generation politicians have strong economical backing. We hardly see any MP or MLA from a relatively poor background. As we have seen through our research that most of the women who are elected as MLAs are from an economically richer section of society.

Further, this, bottoms-up approach, is not an absolute guarantee that women will be represented in the assembly because keeping women out of politics is not just a problem of political parties who do not give chance to women, but also a constitutional and a social problem. The preamble uses the words ‘We the People’ gives ourselves this constitution, but if the ‘supreme document’ cannot guarantee a group minimum power in the political machinery, then the faith of that group would be shaken and hence, the problems need constitutional insurance/reservations.

‘Political Assurance’: Proportionate Reservation

Political empowerment of women is a necessity in eliminating gender inequality and discrimination. Political power is a (sort) of guarantee to the women which will ensure that the elected regime remains legitimate addressing all the issues related to women. If we look at the historical account of the efforts made to reserve seats for women in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, we can trace a ‘background note’ by the Law Ministry which shows that efforts made to reserve seats for women in State Assemblies and House of People always failed due to lack of political consensus.

Again in 2008, Rajya Sabha’s Department related to Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, public grievances, law and justice presented its 36th Report on The Constitution (One Hundred and Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2008 in which the committee recommended for proportionate reservation for women in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. Further AIDMK member orally stated before the committee on the need for reservation for women.

“Reservation for women is not a bounty but it is an honest recognition of their contribution to social development and to the society at large.”

We have seen the justices of the High Court in the past few years (as well) making “misogynistic observations” in cases involving penal sections like Rape, Assault etc. It shows the mindset of the society towards the women that is horrific and has no place in the 21st century and it enhances the need for a political assurance as ‘there is no logic in saying that women are deficient in physical, mental and intellectual capabilities. Still, they have been forced to be earmarked as the weaker sections of the society. In fact, by keeping 50 per cent of the society weaker we have made the whole society weak. In such a situation, some compulsory legislative measures need to be taken for proportionate representation of the women in the State Assemblies and the Lok Sabha as well.’

The arguments against the reservation of women state that women empowerment cannot be done through such measures, instead, we need a societal change where everyone changes from within. But such ‘Gandhian’ bottom’s up approach fails in the long run as the people do not have an incentive to change their attitude and behaviour towards the other gender. Rather, constitutional insurances which guarantee formal equality accelerates the ‘process of change’ in the society as seen in the case and experiment of Reservation of 33% for women in Panchayati Raj. The Committee which recommended the reservation for women also observed that ‘the data shows that through 1/3rd reservation of seats for women in Panchayats and Nagarpalikas, they have been able to make meaningful contributions and that the actual representation of women in Panchayati Raj institutions has gone up to 42.3% i.e., beyond the reservation percentage.’

Impossibility of Reservation in Rajya Sabha: ‘Article 80 of the Constitution specifies that members of state assemblies will elect Rajya Sabha MPs through a single transferable vote.  This implies that the votes are first allocated to the most preferred candidate, and then to the next preferred candidate, and so on.  This system cannot accommodate the principle of reserving a certain number of seats for a particular group.  Currently, Rajya Sabha does not have a reservation for SCs and STs. Therefore, any system that provides reservation in Rajya Sabha implies that the Constitution must be amended to jettison the Single Transferable Vote system.’

Anyhow, leaving the Rajya Sabha aside, the Preamble of the Indian Constitution states and guarantees that every citizen must be secured of ‘equality of status and opportunity’. These commitments in the Preamble must be the objective of the legislature which they must seek to achieve while enacting an amendment for reservation of women. The data shows that the women are not represented equally in the Assemblies and there is a need for change, or else questions against the legitimacy of the democracy will strengthen. Equality for women is not just a game of mockery and gimmickry for ‘International women’s day’, but it is a continuous effort to eradicate various social, economic and political gaps between the genders.

This is a research conducted by Chaitanya Singh, Founder and Editor of Constitutional Renaissance Blog. The author would like to thank Ms Raksha Tripathy, Ms Sulagna Sarkar and Mr Yuvraj Ranolia for assisting in data analysis and research.