The Supreme court on Tuesday granted interim protection to former BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma. The court directed that no coercive steps be taken against her in the multiple FIRs registered in different states, over her remarks on Prophet Mohammed during a TV debate. The court also said that the same protection will be available for any FIRs registered in the future in respect to the same telecast. The top court essentially granted her the same protection which she was seeking earlier.
Continue reading “Nupur Sharma gets relief from SC: Notes on clubbing on FIRs and TT Anthony Case”Guest Post: Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land with Special focus on the Civil Liberties
[This is a post by Sana Afraz and Malobika Sen]
Introduction: What were the intentions of the Founding Fathers?
Let us remember what the Constitution makers envisioned for this nation and the liberty of its people, before we are accused of mirroring our own virtues as the Constitution’s burden. Not only is ‘liberty’ lawfully sacrosanct, it emanates from the core on which the Constitution was built, the preamble. From the perception that ultimate sovereignty rests with the people of India, ergo, power is derived from the people. Dr. Ambedkar professed this public-supremacy in his concluding speech in the Constituent Assembly: “Political democracy cannot last unless it lies at the base of its social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognizes Liberty, equality, and fraternity…”
Democracy is dynamized with certain minimal and intrinsic rights, a requisite for a free and civilized existence: Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity; and to promote fraternity. It is the proverbial truth that without liberty, there cannot exist a democracy.
Liberty as we know it
The knight in shining armor of this proverbial truth is Article 19, which guarantees to the citizens of India, six paramount rights. While Liberty is also covered under Articles 20, 21, and 22, Article 19 is distinctive, as it speaks of ‘basic liberty‘ as opposed to ‘personal liberty.’
The six rights under Article 19, briefly understood are: (1) Freedom of speech and expression: (Article 19(1)(a)), is indispensable and allows for open channels of free discourse; (2) Right to assemble (Article 19(1)(b))peaceably and without arms; (3) Right to form associations or unions: Article 19(1)(c) The need for collective strength and such freedom is upheld under this right. (4) Liberty to move freely (Article 19(1)(d)) and (5) reside and settle in any part of India ( Article 19(1)(e)) These rights illustrate the notion that India is one indivisible unit, territorially (and metaphorically). (6) Liberty to practice any profession or carry on occupation: (Article 19(1)(g)) and an individual cannot be forced to accept a livelihood.
How is Liberty statutorily restricted?
While Liberty is inviolable, the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1), are not absolute, as no right can be. As was observed in Gopalan vs. State of Madras (1950) “There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restraint, for that would lead to anarchy and disorder.”
Thus, the rights under Article 19 may be regulated by laws made by Parliament or State Legislatures (Clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19), as ‘reasonable’ restrictions. So far as (i) the freedom of speech is concerned, the right can be enjoyed subject to the interests of’ ‘security of State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency, morality, sovereignty and integrity, or concerning contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to offense.’ (ii)The right to assemble, may be restricted in the interest of public order, sovereignty and integrity of India; (iii) right to form associations or unions, impose the same limitations along with an additional ground of morality; (iv) right to move freely and (v) the right to reside and settle in any part, is also limited to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public or Scheduled Tribe; (vi) right to practice a profession or run a business may be restricted in the interest of the general public. The State may also make laws regarding necessary qualifications or to create a monopoly in its favor.
However the right is paramount and restrictions are auxiliary and the burden is on the authority to justify the restrictions.
Reasonable restrictions
While the restrictions are legally sound, how then, do we judge their ‘reasonability’?
Since society was created and the chaos that followed, there is a pursuit to bind an individual under the realm of civilization. No one exists in society with the (arrogant) expectation of living in complete freedom, and minimum restrictions become imperative for harmony to prevail and anarchy to desist. Judicial precedents establish that there is no mathematical paradigm to determine these restrictions. However, there exists a general understanding. While analyzing a restrictive legislation, reasonability and proportionality come into play. These help analyze the legislation in two ways, whether ‘directly’ as infringing fundamental rights or whether they are ‘proportional’ to constitutional limitations.
Over time, the courts have taken care not to be misguided by the apparent ‘intention’ of legislation but surgically manoeuvre through elements of public interest, rights and remedy. In effect, the burden is on the State to prove there is no proximate nexus to the infringement of Fundamental Rights. Another yardstick is to see whether the legislation passes the test of public interest, such that whether or not it upholds the Directive Principles of State Policies. The courts are to prudently evaluate the effect of the legislation, however ‘noble’ its intention.
Constitution as the Supreme law
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and permeates each institution in the country. This unassailable supremacy is enunciated in Minerva Mills v Union of India, as, “People of the country, the organs of the government, legislature, executive and judiciary are all bound by the Constitution, which is the paramount law of the land, and nobody is above or beyond the Constitution.” Separation of power was established, while denominating the Constitution as the only sovereign, beyond all else.
The courts have carried the weight of this supremacy with great diligence. In India, overpopulated and developing, it is a persistent concern that exercising the liberty of one may infringe the liberty of another. The Supreme Court, through its powers of judicial review, can audit whether a law surmounts its limits set by the Constitution. This constitutionally derived power enables the court to protect liberty, as in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, where it was held that reasonability of state actions shall be measured against the scale of proportionality.
Recently, Calcutta High Court set aside a ‘Leave India Notice’ issued by the government to a Polish student in India, involved in the anti-CAA protests, by equating the administrative action to a ‘paranoid overreaction’. Similarly, the Bombay High Court upheld the freedom of conscience of a school teacher, a non-believer and nullified his suspension for not folding his hands during school prayers. These illustrations embody that restraint of liberty may be warranted, but constitutionally powered checks on the restraint, prevent the becoming of a despotic dictatorship.
Conclusion: The need to find a balance
What we need is to prevent the tilting of the scale of checks, towards the side of social control. In the recent past, arguably, this tilt has been deepening. Whether it is the excessive use of force against anti-CAA protesters, application of the UAPA on student activists on flexible degrees of suspicion, excessive force against farmers protesting against the farm bills, hastened passing of controversial laws without proper discourse, recurring contempt petitions; without getting into the merit of these issues, what we observe is a marked rise in the shushing of the common man.
While the responsibility towards liberty is not an isolated one, the courts are duty-bound to register their intervention when such liberty is in peril. Consider the Covid-19 situation and imposition of a ‘lock-down’ in light of migrant workers and traders. While the argument isn’t to say that the State cannot put such a restriction at the eve of a pandemic, it is towards questioning a means-ends relationship between the measures and the goal it sets out to achieve. Recall that Covid-19 spreads through close proximity and public health guidelines require ‘social distancing’. An observation of a rapid, all-pervasive ban on individual movement – a restriction on the freedom of movement and trade, which has varying degrees of effects on differently placed citizens, also soliciting selective ostracization and excessive force, would be arguably, disproportionate.
It is easy to overlook technical niceties in the face of a crisis when our own head isn’t in the lion’s mouth, but isn’t that where the courts step in?
Notably, the guidelines under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, or the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1867, themselves largely impose a ban on gatherings and not individual movement. These restrictions can be traced to Article 19(5) and 19(6) under the concern of ‘general public interest’. However, we need the courts to prevent disproportionate restriction in the pursuit of ‘general public interest’ at the cost of that very public.
While liberty cannot be unrestricted, we cannot undermine the sanctuary of balance.
Marital Rape in India: The Public/Private Dichotomy
[This is a post by Panya Mathur, Contributing Member]
[Editorial Note: Constitutional Renaissance Blog would like to thank Ms Bansari Kamdar for having an insightful discussion on ‘Marital Rape Laws’ in India. Reach out to Ms Kamdar here.]
In India, there exists a complex conundrum in relation to the vast number of issues surrounding the criminalisation of marital rape. There has been a great measure of sanctity involved with marriage. Marriage is seen as a sacrament, a union of two souls, who will remain in complete exclusivity to one another for all purposes in their lifetime. This can be proved by the existence of personal laws in the country. For instance, the institution of marriage in the Hindu community occupies a prime role in the social construct of a Hindu. The concept of consent in the sexual relationship in a marriage is dicey and difficult to navigate. A marriage rests on the concepts of a moral cement that produces ‘two-in-one-ship’.
The exception to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity IPC) states as follows:
“Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
And the Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:
“Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether under a decree of separation or otherwise, without her consent, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
The notion of the Marital Rape exception can be traced as far back as 1736 when Sir Matthew Hales declared that ‘the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which cannot retract.’
The horrors of Harvender Kaur
In the case of Harvender Kaur v. Harmender Singh Choudhary, the Court did not hesitate to opine that “the introduction of constitutional law in the home is most inappropriate. It is like introducing a bull in a china shop and that neither Article 21 nor Article 14 had any place in the privacy of the home. In a sensitive sphere which is at once most intimate and delicate, the introduction of the cold principles of constitutional law will have the effect of weakening the marriage bond”. In the case of Smt. Saroja Rani vs. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, the bench judge explicitly agrees to the judgement given in the Harvinder Kaur Case, hoisting the requirement of the existence of a private sphere wherein the law does not seek a stance, in order to preserve the moral fabric and sanctity of the society.
However, what has been conveniently ignored by the Hon’ble Court is that in both conditions of rape and marital rape the primary definition of rape remains a constant that is sexual penetration or intercourse wherein there exists a lack of consent. Therefore, to prove that the crime of rape has occurred, it is essential to prove the absence of unequivocal consent. Moreover, the burden to prove this absence of consent usually rests on the victim; however, in certain cases such as that in the case of minors, it is presumed that consent does not exist due to the presumption created in law that such minors are incapable of providing consent to any sexual acts. Similarly, in the case where the victim and perpetrator are in a marital relationship, there is a presumption of consent on the part of the wife even when such equivocal consent required by Section 375 is not present. The same can be proved by the mere existence of the exception to Section 375 of I P C. Moreover, the State has selectively penetrated into this marital sphere by enacting legislation that deals with the violence of women in matrimonial homes. PWDVA, 2005 and Section 498A of the IPC provides a remedy for women who are victims of forms of abuse in the marital sphere. Hence, to empower women and protect them from violence in a domestic relationship, the State should rightfully criminalize marital rape break down the public/private dichotomy. The Supreme Court in the case of Independent Thought v. Union of India, partly struck down a part of the exception clause in section 375 citing it to be in violation of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and in violation of a child’s fundamental rights. The court notes that marriage cannot be the sole reason for any reasonable differentiation for girls between the ages of 15-18 years. In doing so the court explicitly made note of the fact that marriage cannot be reasonable classification. Even though the court keenly observed that the judgment did not speak of adult marital rape it is important to note that the court held a woman’s right cannot be subservient to her personal rights simply on basis of marriage.
In the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. K. Shyam Sundar, the Court has held that whenever there is express arbitrariness that exists in law or State action, irrespective of whether it was legislative or not, Article 14 immediately springs into action, and the said action is struck down. Moreover, the term ‘arbitrary’ means an act that has been done in a manner that is unreasonable, and has been done at pleasure and has been done in a capricious manner without any determining principle, not founded on the nature of things, is non-rational and does not have a standard functioning principle. In order to find out that an act is arbitrary, there must be proof of ‘substantive unreasonableness’ and in the said circumstance, the test of reasonable differentia has not been complied with, because the purpose of criminal laws prohibiting rape or indeed any kind of physical violence or unwanted touching is to maintain a person’s bodily integrity.
Conclusion
However, it must be noted that there are numerous other legislations that protect the rights of married women which have been provided by the Legislature. One cannot look at the exception to rape in isolation, and state that the rights of married women have been deprived. The overall position is that the husband can still be liable for domestic violence or cruelty under the IPC and other specific legislation. Spousal rape should be viewed as an abuse of the marriage relationship, with some protection being deemed necessary for the abused spouse. The State provides protection for the same under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as well as the Section 498A of Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the marital sphere does not rest on the pillars of contracts sealed with permanent terms and conditions that must be maintained to continue the relationship. Neither does the concept of marriage exist on the tenets of Constitutional Law to enforce inalienable rights into a relationship of such sanctity. Thus, it can be concluded that there exists a lack of protection that exists when it comes to the rights of married women in the country. And this lacunae in the law should either be resolved by removing the exception 2 of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, that excludes married women from the purview of its protection, or by extending the purview of Section 498A and other such laws.