[This is a post by Panya Mathur, Contributing Member]
“Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by the rulers as useful.” -Lucius Annaeus Seneca
Through this article, I intend to introduce the concept of Right to Religion as well as Right to Equality as enshrined under the Constitution of India. I will be discussing the scope of these rights in detail and will be commenting briefly on the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, popularly known as the Sabrimala Judgement, which is a landmark judgement that shines some light on the conflict between these fundamental rights.
Right to religious freedom
Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution of India provide the right to freedom of religion. The right to practice any religion freely is provided under Article 25 of the Constitution of India.
Under Article 25, two distinct terms namely religion and conscience have been conceptualized. While the bare constitution makes no mention of these aforementioned terms, the jurisprudence of the courts has laid down comprehensively the meaning and boundaries of the term ‘religion’. In one of its earliest cases, Comm., Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmindru Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, the Supreme Court has laid down extensively the meaning and ambit of ‘religion’,
“…religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and not necessarily theistic… a religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well- being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine of belief…it may prescribe rituals and observances, and modes of worship…might even extend to matters of food and dress.”
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Constitution of India guarantees to every independent religious denomination the right to manage its affairs and maintain institutions for religious purposes and to manage and maintain the same. The interpretation of the term ‘religion’ for the purposes of Article 26 of the Constitution is a set of practices that have its belief in a basic set of doctrines and beliefs that the followers of such religion base their very spiritual well-being depend upon. The case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India laid down a three-part test to determine whether a said group of religious worshippers can be construed to be a religious denomination for the purposes of Article 26 of the Constitution of India:
1. Must be a collection of individuals who have a set of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being;
2. A common organisation;
3. A distinctive name;
These two articles form the very basis of the fundamental right to practice a religion of choice to every citizen of the country. However, the rights enshrined under Article 25 are subject to public order, morality and health. Morality, in itself a very ambiguous and broad term, which gives rise to a plethora of interpretations across the population. Even the courts have failed to clarify the scope of the term ‘morality’ through its judgements and have resorted to an approach that differs from case to case.
Right to Equality
Article 14 of the Constitution of India mandates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of laws. It reads as: “Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” The permissible classification must satisfy the twin sets, namely:
(i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the class, and;
(ii) such differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
In the case of Budhan v. State of Bihar, the Hon’ble Court stated that the validity of the Act depends on the object of the legislation in view and whatever has a reasonable relation to the object or purpose of the legislation is a reasonable basis for classification of the objects coming under the purview of the enactment. The court further stated that what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It has been a well-settled principle by the Supreme Court in the case of FN Balsara v. State of Bombay that in every form of classification, there would exist some form of inequality, and the mere existence of such inequality is not enough to violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
It can be very well conferred from the various judgements pronounced by the Supreme Court that if a particular belief is deeply rooted in the various practices of the worshippers of a particular religion, then there exists a reasonable nexus between the object of the legislation and the classification itself; therefore, making the religious practice valid, and not arbitrary.
However, it is pertinent to note that Equality and non-discrimination are certainly one facet of Constitutional Morality. However, the concept of equality and non- discrimination in matters of religion cannot be viewed in isolation. Constitutional morality requires the harmonization or balancing of all such rights, to ensure that the religious beliefs of none are obliterated or undermined. (Constitutional Morality viz-a-viz will be discussed later on this blog)
Sabarimala Judgment
A five-judge Constitutional bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court ruled 4:1 in favour of allowing women of all ages to enter the temple and found the practice prejudicial in its very essence and that it violates women‘s right to practice religion. It also ruled that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination as they do not have any common religious tenets specific and different to themselves other than those which are customary to the Hindu religion. The verdict established the principle that individual freedom prevails over professed group rights, even in religious matters and relooks at the stigmatization of women devotees based on a medieval perspective that menstruation symbolizes impurity and pollution. It declares that the exclusion on the basis of impurity is a form of untouchability. Justice Indu Malhotra, however, delivered a dissenting opinion. She argued that constitutional morality in a secular polity, such as India, requires a ‘harmonisation‘ of various competing claims to fundamental rights. She stated that the Court must respect a religious denomination’s right to manage their internal affairs, regardless of whether their practices are rational or logical. Justice Indu Malhotra also highlighted that the primary reason for the imposition of this custom is the very well-being of the idol itself and that the well-being of the idol can be translated to the well-being of the devotees thereunder and since such ideas are distilled into the human brain to be a part of one’s religious practices itself, it becomes a part of the person’s faith and therefore, cannot be violated by demolishing such faith under the guise of superstition or irrationality.
This judgement gave rise to a rather heated debate where citizens began to criticize the apex court for overreaching its judicial powers. Academicians across the country believe that notions of rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts and the apex court should have refrained from doing so. But some people also celebrated the decision as they believed that the practices which legitimise menstrual taboos due to notions of purity and pollution, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education, and the right of entry to places of worship and eventually their access to the public sphere. It is, however, fairly disappointing that not a lot of attention was paid to the constitutional framework that was discussed in this case and how the principle of harmonious construction was held to be of grave importance.
A five-judge Constitutional bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court ruled 4:1 in favour of allowing women of all ages to enter the temple and found the practice prejudicial in its very essence and that it violates women‘s right to practice religion. It also ruled that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination as they do not have any common religious tenets specific and different to themselves other than those which are customary to the Hindu religion. The verdict established the principle that individual freedom prevails over professed group rights, even in religious matters and relooks at the stigmatization of women devotees based on a medieval perspective that menstruation symbolizes impurity and pollution. It declares that the exclusion on the basis of impurity is a form of untouchability. Justice Indu Malhotra, however, delivered a dissenting opinion. She argued that constitutional morality in a secular polity, such as India, requires a ‘harmonisation‘ of various competing claims to fundamental rights. She stated that the Court must respect a religious denomination’s right to manage their internal affairs, regardless of whether their practices are rational or logical. Justice Indu Malhotra also highlighted that the primary reason for the imposition of this custom is the very well-being of the idol itself and that the well-being of the idol can be translated to the well-being of the devotees thereunder and since such ideas are distilled into the human brain to be a part of one’s religious practices itself, it becomes a part of the person’s faith and therefore, cannot be violated by demolishing such faith under the guise of superstition or irrationality.
This judgement gave rise to a rather heated debate where citizens began to criticize the apex court for overreaching its judicial powers. Academicians across the country believe that notions of rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts and the apex court should have refrained from doing so. But some people also celebrated the decision as they believed that the practices which legitimise menstrual taboos due to notions of purity and pollution, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education, and the right of entry to places of worship and eventually their access to the public sphere. It is, however, fairly disappointing that not a lot of attention was paid to the constitutional framework that was discussed in this case and how the principle of harmonious construction was held to be of grave importance.
Concluding Remarks
The philosophy of testing religious practices under the ambit of only Article 14, and the principles of rationality that it engages in, is in primary derogation of the Constitution in itself. By only applying the twin test laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution i.e. the fact that there should be a reasonable nexus between the object of the law and the very concept of intelligible differentia, the fundamental right protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of India is left untouched and undiscussed. Furthermore, as discussed in the case of Bijoe Emanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors, this Hon’ble Court laid down that the personal view of judges are irrelevant in ascertaining whether a particular religion or a belief followed therein should be protected under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. Unlike the Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which is subject to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution, Article 26 is subject only to public order, morality, and health, and not to the other provisions of the Constitution of India. And as a result, the Fundamental Rights of the religious denominations are not subject to either Articles 14 or 15 of the Constitution. And thus, the principles of equality and non-discrimination as enunciated by Articles 14 and 15 are grossly inadequate in limiting the freedom to manage religious affairs under Article 26. The characterization of age may form a reasonable basis for the object of specific legislation. On satisfying both the parts of the twin test aforementioned, the statute must be held to be valid legislation. As already proved that the decision of the temple board is deeply based in the beliefs of the worshippers of the temple therein, there exists a reasonable nexus between the object of the legislation and the classification itself; therefore, making the classification valid, and not arbitrary.
(Note: In my next article, I will be focussing more on the aspect of essential religious practices as defined under Article 25 and its scope with special reference to Article 13 and 17 of the Constitution of India, in the light of the principles established by the Supreme Court in the Sabrimala Judgement. Access the Article here.)
