Hate Speech vs Free Speech: Where is the current strongest?

[This is a post by Diksha Dadu, Contributing Member]

In this blog, I will be focusing upon the legal provisions with respect to the concept of Hate Speech by critically analyzing Indian precedents and certain foreign judgments to differentiate between discussion and the advocacy of incitement acts which are considered prejudicial to maintenance of peace and harmony. Furthermore, I will be enunciating upon an effort to find a transformative yet harmonious approach in relation to hate speech on Freedom of Expression and examining the restriction thereof, followed by the conclusion.

Introduction

“…[T]hat the law shall be certain, and that it shall be just and shall move with the times.”Lord Reid, Judge as Law Maker

The disparity in jurisprudence on hate speech has been considered as remotely distant in Indian Constitutional Law while the terrain of free speech still remains a contested field. “Hate speech is termed as the speech that carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some group, such as a particular race, especially in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence”, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary. According to Article 19(1)(a), the right to freedom of speech and expression is granted to every citizen of democratic India. However, the constitution also provides for the reasonable restrictions against free speech in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence under Article 19(2) of The Constitution of India. The 2017 Law Commission Report, No. 267 recommended the introduction of new provisions within the penal code that specifically punish incitement to violence in addition to the existing ones while examining the scope of hate speech laws in India. Moreover, free speech is considered quintessential for every democracy to work efficiently. The doctrine of free speech has evolved as a bulwark against the state’s power to regulate speech. The liberal doctrine was a measure against the undemocratic power of the state.

Thus, this gives us an inference upon the reflection and attitude of our legislature and the juncture of decision making by the judiciary towards the issue of hate speech and the real extent of its reasonable restrictions thereof.

Hate Speech: Regulations and Legal Provisions in India 

In a democratic country like India which possess diverse communities of people, castes, creed, religions and languages as its unique nature, the principle of autonomy and free speech does not malign properly and wholly. This idiosyncratic nature of our Indian structure is one of the greatest challenges before the principle of autonomy and free speech principle. There is a constant battle of opinions to ensure that this liberty is not exercised to the detriment of any individual or the disadvantaged group or section of the society. 

As per the Indian Penal Code, the concept of hate speech constitutes under Section 153A, which is the offence of promoting communal disharmony or feelings of hatred between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 categorizes the offence of promoting religious, racist, linguistic, community or caste hatred or incites any religious, caste or any other disharmony or enmity within India, through any speech either in written form or spoken, Section 298 also classifies the offence of uttering words with the deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person, Section 505 similarly criminalizes the act of delivering speeches that incite violence. As per the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 123(3A) also criminalizes hate speech of candidates contesting elections. 
In 2014, a Public Interest Litigation was filed before the Supreme Court of India seeking guidelines on hate speech during elections. It observed that hate speech attempts to marginalize individuals on the basis of their membership in a group which impacts such people socially by diminishing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, the Court observed, lays the groundwork for aggravated attacks on the vulnerable communities in the future. This weakens the ability of people to participate wholly in a democracy. It was further observed that the existing laws in India were sufficient to tackle hate speeches. The root of the problem is not the absence of laws but rather a lack of their effective execution, the Court reiterated.

Analysis of Hate Speech in India: Extent of Reasonable Restriction Principle and Position of State

The issue of the validity of hate speech laws and the extent of already existing hate speech laws has always been a heated debate in India. This issue has time and again raised before the legislature, court as well as the public. Under Article 19(2), the hate speech can be curtailed on the grounds of public order, incitement to offence and security of the State. In the infamous case of Ram Manohar Lohiya v. State of Bihar, the Apex Court observed that “One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represent the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not the security of the State.” The standard approach applied for restricting Article 19(1)(a) is the highest when imposed in the interest of the security of the State. 

Further, the Supreme Court while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 295A IPC ruled that this section does not penalize every act of insult or attempt to ‘insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalizes only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.’ It was held that if an act does not actually cause a breach of public order, its restriction ‘in the interest of public order’ will be deemed reasonable with respect to Article 19(2), since it has a much wider connotation than interest and maintenance of public order. 

In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the court observed that expression could only be restricted when discussion and advocacy amounted to incitement, however, when no ingredient in offence of inciting anybody to do anything which a reasonable man would then the tendency of being an immediate threat to public safety or tranquillity would diminish. Therefore, the context of speech plays a vital role in determining its legitimacy under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and that our commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered.

Hence, after analyzing the recent landmark decisions, it could be re-iterated that a speech protective regime has been followed in India. The main cause of action behind such a stance is the apprehension and fear of misuse of restrictive statutes by the State. Such a regime has been followed in the United States and the Courts therein are extremely cautious in restricting Article 19 of the Constitution to avoid vitriolic approaches from the public. Pluralism, tolerance, peace and non-discrimination have been termed non-derogatory values by the ECHR in ascertaining the extent of free speech allowed under the Convention.

Conclusion

Hate speech poses a complex situation against freedom of speech and expression. The constitutional approach to these challenges has been far from uniform as the boundaries between impermissible propagation of hatred and protected speech vary across jurisdictions. 

In a landmark judgment of Canada v Taylor, the constitutional validity of hate speech laws was challenged since it violated the right to freedom of speech and expression. It was held that hate and propaganda contribute little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada in the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self‑development, or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged. The Supreme Court of Canada opined that hate speech laws are indeed a part of the global commitment to eradicate racism and communal disharmony. 

However, ‘with every right comes responsibility’; and therein, is the need for a limitation on the right to freedom of speech and expression so as to prevent the destructive and regressive effect it could have. There is a massive need to revise and amend the existing anti-discrimination legislation with respect to hate speech without curtailing the freedom of speech and expression of people. Laws should be implemented in a non-selective, non-arbitrary and transparent manner, along the lines of golden principles of the constitution which should not be used to stifle dissent or the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Lastly, the fight against hate speech should not be pursued in isolation but with a harmonious holistic approach. Our constitutional history must be maligned with the traditional approaches along the lines of recent development and usage of hate speech laws, especially in terms of yellow journalism these days. With excessive interference of the media into the facts and evidence of the case has led the judiciary to negatively view such journalists as ‘thought intelligentsia’, which in turn impacts the justice delivery system as well. Therefore, a harmonious balance must be drawn while dealing with such matters and reasonable restrictions must be applied and followed strictly and not liberally in our diverse democratic country.

A Conservative Amendment in a Liberal Constitution: The First Amendment

[Editorial Note: The author would like to thank Tripurdaman Singh for his book Sixteen Stormy Days: The Story of the First Amendment of the Constitution of India and Amit Varma for a wonderful discussion on his podcast Seen and the Unseen]

It was the year 1951 and the Supreme Court had passed two judgments, Brij Bhushan v. the State of Delhi and Romesh Thapar v. the State of Madras, upholding the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under the Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution. It was before the First Constitutional Amendment when the Constitution was considered to be ‘fairly liberal’ as the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 were not subject to so many restrictions as we see today. Restrictions were there in the original Constitution as well, no doubt, as they are necessary. Then, the freedoms were the rights and the restrictions were the exceptions to those rights. But what followed after these two judgments was an act of Parliament (more of Nehru’s) which turned the freedoms into (somewhat) exceptions.

The First Constitutional Amendment, 1951

It has to be kept in mind that the first amendment was discussed and passed by the provisional parliament which did not have a ‘popular mandate’. It was the provisional Parliament’s members who framed the Constitution but they were not the constituent assembly. But for Nehru, it did not make any difference, as he said in the assembly:

“Now, that Constituent Assembly which has gone into the history of India is no more; but we who sit here, or nearly all of us, still continue that tradition, that link. In fact, it is we after all, who was the Constituent Assembly and who drafted this Constitution. Then we were not supposed to be competent enough to draft the Constitution. But now, the work we did was so perfect that we are not now competent enough to touch it! That is rather an odd argument.” 

He was right somehow, they were not competent to amend the Constitution as they did not have any popular mandate and this amendment could have waited till the elections. But it was nothing, but sixty stormy days of debates, discussion and dictatorial behaviour! Before the amendment, Article 19(2) read as:

“(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevents the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.”

It did not have any ‘reasonable restriction’ clause in it. But the restrictions were not so much. After the amendment, clause 2 of Article 19 read as follows:

“(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

This means that parliament can frame a ‘law’ which can restrict the freedom of speech and expression if that law is in furtherance of the restrictions given thereunder. Restrictions like public order or incitement to an offence are vague and can create a long-lasting chilling effect and they are, even now. Suppose, there is a rally in protest against any law passed by the state, then the state can restrict that protest and say it violates the public order, hence, citizens cannot exercise their right to speak against the government and they can invoke the draconian section 124A (Sedition) of IPC, 1860 [which is an offence under a law made by the state].

The Reasons for Amendment and the Opposing Views

In the cases of Brij Bhusan and Romesh Thapar, the government attempted to curb the freedom of the press and the right to free speech and expression. But the Court struck down that imposed restraint on civil liberties. When the question of interpretation of Article 19 came up, the Supreme Court held that if the maintenance of public, order or securing the public safety was something which did not affect the security of the State or the overthrowing of the State, then there could be no restriction on freedom of speech. The amendment was being made to overrule these judgments [hence, the words public order etc. were added], but PM Nehru said ingeniously in the assembly as he said: “We are not putting down any kind of curb or restraint. We are removing certain doubts so as to enable Parliament to function if it so chooses and when it chooses. Nothing else happens when this Bill is passed except to clarify the authority of Parliament.” These amendments have chilling effects till now. We still see so many violations of civil rights in the name of these so-called restrictions.

Nehru’s vision of freedom was more conservative (and not so liberal) as a Prime Minister than as a leader of the Congress party during the freedom struggle. According to him, the freedom of speech ‘carries with itself responsibilities and obligations’ and if they are not performed, then there would be no freedom. This goes against liberal thought.

The Parliament and the government could have dealt with the problems of public order or incitement of offence through preventive detention laws. Now, supposing there are persons who are preaching murder and who are doing, something of that character, supposing there is some newspaper which is doing something of that character and the writer is there, the individual can be secured under the Preventive Detention Act. So, if the Parliament or the Government want to prevent a person or group of persons from committing acts which they consider to be against the interests of public order, then they are already clothed with sufficient authority to do so.

The amendment does not bear any fruit, except increasing the power of the government. Another restriction which is placed is the restriction on criticism or speech on ‘friendly relations with other states’. On this Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, who I feel is a text-book example of a classic liberal during the debates, said: “I have not been able to find any precedent in any part of the civilised world whereby law under the provisions of the Constitution criticism of foreign powers is taboo.

He cast doubts on the meaning of ‘friendly relations with other states’, as he said: “we may say anything about a foreign country with the utmost friendship in our hearts but if that country misunderstands and says that it offends it or it affects our friendly relations with them, you are at once bound by the provisions of the Constitution.” If the government today passes any law in furtherance of these restrictions, then anything can be restricted and the civil liberties and freedoms will merely become exceptions.

The fears apprehended by Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee are now re-surfacing back in 2020 as we witness internet shutdown(s) in Kashmir using Section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code, use of draconian laws like National Security Act and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) to curb Freedom of Speech and Expression among other violations. We see these violations of free speech and civil liberties and the reason (not the sole reason though) behind such regressive measures is this hurried, hasty and (“unconstitutional”) First Constitutional Amendment Act. PM Nehru, despite his charismatic leadership and vision, did put the Constitution and civil liberties in danger.

In conclusion, let us revisit the prophetic warning given by Dr Mukherjee and try to draw parallels in contemporary times:

“Maybe you [Nehru] will continue for eternity, in the next generation, for generations unborn; that is quite possible. But supposing some other party comes into authority? What is the precedent you are laying down?

The fears imagined by Mukherjee in 1951 still haunts us today!

Right to Protest, Restrictions and Democracy: Supreme Court and the Chilling Effect

Recently in the case of Amit Sahni v. Union of India, the Supreme Court passed a judgment on an infructuous matter which will have a long-lasting effect on civil liberties, especially the right to protest. The judgment of the Court feels like a judgment written by the central government in furtherance of an ‘executive court’. The 3-judges bench creates a chilling effect on the free speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably (without arms).

The matter relates to the protests being held that Shaheen Bagh (New Delhi) and it was filed in February 2020. The protestors at Shaheen Bagh were dispersed in March after the Nation-wide lockdown which, ‘usually’ lead to dismissal of the matter. The judges ignored the factual matrix present in the case and the reasons for blockade were not because of the protestors, but the administration (police) which blocked the nearby roads and public routes. The Court classifies the constitutional and peaceful protests as “encroachments or obstructions.”

What did the court say?

The Court recognised the right to protest and the right to dissent in a democracy. The Court held that the Articles 19(1) (a) and (b), “in cohesion, enable every citizen to assemble peacefully and protest against the actions or inactions of the State.” Then, the Court moves onto the “reasonable restrictions” stated under Article 19(2) and (3). The judgment looks like as if the norm is turned into an exception, and the exception is now the norm. The Court tried to balance the right to protest with the right of other citizens to commute. It must be noted that the balancing is not done by applying the principles of proportionality, but by presuming that the protests ‘always’ disturbed the smooth traffic and commute of the citizens. The Court did not accept the plea that “an indeterminable number of people can assemble whenever they choose to protest.” This creates a chilling effect on the right to protest – the court cannot sit as an executive and lay down policies. Suppose the government plans to make some amendment in the Constitution which infringes the basic structure of the Constitution, then should the citizens sit quietly and just witness the democratic backsliding or come on the streets to express their will? As Gautam Bhatia says “in today’s day, it is important to retrieve and to build constitutionalism without the Courts, even as it remains equally important to continue to engage with and in the courts.” The check on the executive power must come from the fourth branch of democracy, which is the civil societies, media and the citizens. (See the blog on Executive Aggrandizement and democratic backsliding)

The Right to Assemble Peacefully and the Right to Protest

The rights are guaranteed under clause 1 of Article 19 which are not absolute. The restrictions on those rights placed under clause 2-6 cannot be read widely, but narrowly. They are the exceptions to the rights and must be narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court in the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India held that “a restriction in order to be reasonable must be narrowly tailored or narrowly interpreted so as to abridge or restrict only what is absolutely necessary.” Further, even in the Constituent Assembly the fears of wider interpretation of ‘reasonable’ restrictions were evident as one of the members Mr Sahaya said:

“In the larger interests of the country, and particularly at the formative stage of the country, to give such wide powers in the hands of the State and with regard to such Fundamental rights as, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of movement would, I believe, be harmful and result in the creation of a suffocating and stuffy atmosphere as opposed to the free air of a truly free country.”

The right to assemble peacefully is a fundamental right and an enabling right which leads to opening up of spaces and opportunities for civil societies and citizens at large to engage effectively in decision-making processes. This right help to foster increased transparency and accountability and are basic prerequisites for the ultimate goal of securing substantive enjoyment of different human rights in a constitutional democracy. The right to assemble peacefully is a vehicle which enables other socio-political-economic rights. The state can restrict the said right only by a law in the “interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order”. Fearing the so-called “reasonable restriction”, one of the members of the constituent assembly said (H.J. Khandekar):

“For instance, we are given to believe that we could carry on organised agitation for the welfare of Labour, that we can make, in an organised fashion, a demand for the grant of bonus, and if necessary can assemble in public meetings to back up this demand. The truth is that the law restricting the right of holding public meetings would be enforced. Consequently in view of such a law or laws of this kind to be passed in future it may not be possible to hold any public meeting. Thus it is clear that the Government would be in a position to prevent if it so desires, any agitation by Labour for demanding bonus, since all these restrictive laws would be applicable to the workers also. I, therefore, fail to see the significance of the right of forming associations when I find that its substance is taken away by clause (4).”

The Court by giving the state the wider power to designate the area of the protest and the number of people in the protest somehow validates the fears put forth by the Hon’ble member of the Assembly. The Court also says that the protestors, exercising their right to protest, infringes the right to commute of other citizens as protests lead to traffic jams etc. This requires balancing of rights, not just a blanket assumption. According to the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (20 March 2019, Geneva), it was recommended that, “The State’s obligation to facilitate includes the responsibility to provide basic services, including traffic management, medical assistance and clean-up services. Organizers should not be held responsible for the provision of such services, nor should they be required to contribute to the cost of their provision.” On the choice of place and time, which the Court declined to entertain, the Rapporteur recommends that,

“The choice of the venue or location of an assembly by the organizers is an integral part of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly…… Likewise, public areas around iconic buildings are a logical place for to convey a message with regard to institutions housed in these buildings.”

If the state is to ‘choose’ the place of protest, then it will infringe the right to protest as the protests are done to create an impact on the decision-making process and are for maximum participation by the citizens. It is done to make citizens aware of the actions and inactions of the state. If the state chooses the place of protest, then it might choose a place far from the central place of attraction where those sitting in the institutions can see. Like it happened in Jaipur where the place of protest chosen by the state government was 9 kilometres away from the earlier site chosen by the protestors. The free flow of traffic should not automatically take precedence over freedom of peaceful assembly. In this regard, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has indicated that “the competent institutions of the State have a duty to design operating plans and procedures that will facilitate the exercise of the right of assembly … [including] rerouting pedestrian and vehicular traffic in a certain area”. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur points to a decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court which stated that “in a democratic society, the urban space is not only an area for circulation, but also for participation.”

A protest is done in the larger public interest, it is done to exercise dissent against various policies of the state (and sometimes against the judgments of the Court). Holding a protest outside the city, or where there is no attention will ‘extinct’ the genesis of the protest and will fetch no fruits. The Supreme Court held “it has to be borne in mind that total extinction is not balancing” (see Asha Ranjan v. the State of Bihar (2017) 4 SCC 397).

The difficulties caused to the citizens exercising their ‘right to free movement’ is due to the states’ failure to take adequate and sufficient steps. If the state will take necessary actions to “ensure that such dharnas and demonstrations are held within their bounds [and the traffic is diverted, instead of closing the roads], it would have balanced the rights of protestors as well as the residents.” (Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, 2017)

Instead of being a mute spectator, the state and the police authorities should have arranged routes and spaces near Shaheen Bagh for the commuters to exercise their right to ‘free movement’ instead of blaming the protestors for their own insufficiency and inadequacy. The decision of the court to provide a blanket ban on the demonstrations lead to infringement of rights of the citizens and creates a chilling effect. It is the duty of the state to balance the rights of stakeholders and the Court must only adjudicate and protect the rights of every citizen. The purpose of holding protests is that they reach concerned persons for whom these are meant and to exercise the democratic right guaranteed by the Constitution. The decision of the Court is wrong as it will lead to fresh restrictions on the right. To conclude, in the words of TM Krishna, “Unless public spaces are freely available for demonstrations, we will remain a mute democracy.

The Right to Information and Abrogation of Article 370

[This is a post by Suvechha Sarkar, Contributing Member. Her previous post on ‘disastrous effect of lockdown and abrogation of Article 370’ can be accessed here.]

Introduction

The erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, one of the northern states of India, which was considered as a State until 2019 was reorganised into a Union Territory. The living conditions along with the rights of the residents of Jammu and Kashmir has been under major threat from the day of the removal of its autonomous position as a ‘state’. Apart from the violation of certain Human Rights, one of the most important fundamental rights of the Indian Citizens, to hold the administration accountable is also being infringed there. It was none other than the Right to Information which falls under Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution.

Right to Information and the Constitution of India

The Right to Information is a part of  Article 19(1) which states that every citizen has Freedom of speech and expression. It has been a topic of hot debate whether or not the Right to Information falls under the ‘speech and expression’. In the year 1976, in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, the Supreme Court stated in its judgement that it is not possible for people to express or speak up if they do not know about what is happening around them properly and thus it falls under the provisions of Article 19. (further, refer to S.P. Gupta v. Union of India) Though there were no particular provisions in the Constitution stating it as the Fundamental Right, on the 13th of October, 2005, the Right to Information Act was brought into effect.

To illustrate the Act, if we ever go to a government office and ask for the information of their working, they would certainly not provide us with it, and would rather ask one to see their way out. If we want to exercise our right to information, then the right needs to be laid down in the law (RTI Act). After the introduction of the RTI Act, the citizens can claim the information legally, even with the help of the judiciary (in an appeal if the appellate authority rejects to provide the asked information). Before the RTI Act was introduced, many other states had by then passed the Act. The states were namely: Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Assam and Goa.

The rights which were listed under the Acts mainly consisted of:

  1. Right to Information
  2. Seek any kind of information from the government bodies
  3. Receive copies of governmental documents
  4. Do an inspection of the works done by the government.

The Jammu Kashmir Right to Information Act, 2009

The first Right to Information Act (State Act) was enacted on 7th January 2004 in Jammu and Kashmir. The main focus of the Act was to gain information from the government alongside the Government records. This Act was repealed and replaced further by the Right to Information Act of 2008 and finally by the Jammu and Kashmir Act of 2009. The 2009 RTI Act of Jammu and Kashmir fell under the election campaigns of Omar Abdullah. After he came to power, a draft of the Act was introduced and the Bill was finally passed on 12th March. 

The Act  stated as undermentioned:

6. Request for obtaining information. – (1) A person, who desires to obtain any information under the Act, shall make a request in writing or through electronic means in English, Urdu or Hindi accompanying such fee as may be prescribed, to –

(a) the Public Information Officer of the concerned public authority;

(b) the Assistant Public Information Officer, specifying the particulars of the information sought by him or her.”

The Right to Information Act of 2005 by the Central Government was not applicable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state’s Act ultimately provided the activists, civil society groups and the advocates of transparency and accountability with RTI 2009. The then Jammu and Kashmir Government had taken this as a part of their electoral promise. Information could be sought by the residents of the state in the form of large size paper copies, floppy disks, compact discs and many more, by paying a certain amount of fees. This was how the Right to Information Act was being brought to use in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Abrogation of Article 370 and effect on RTI

The state RTI Act clearly states that a person who desires any kind of information as listed under the Act, he or she can seek for the following by the means of internet (‘through the electronic mode’) or in written form. Prior to the abrogation of Article 370 on 5th August, curfew under Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code (with essential services cut down), was being imposed in various parts of the state, especially in the Kashmir Valley. It was after this situation that many of the Indian Media started complaining that they were unable to receive any information from the Kashmir Valley despite their several reasonable attempts as the internet services were completely stopped in the valley except in the government working offices for carrying out their respective tasks. 

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) informed that one of the local journalists, who was also an editor of a news website-The Kashmiriyat Walla, was arrested by the Kashmiri Police under no specific charges. The Press release was completely stopped and there were various other instances where editors of various newspapers were being arrested without unspecific charges and put under unlawful detention. However, the news channel Indian Times Now stated that their channel did not find much of a restriction, which is really surprising as other news channels and individuals were totally cut off from the valley. Several other Indian Media Reporters, outside Kashmir, claimed that they were unable to get any information from the Muslim majority areas in Kashmir except for a few blocks (as reported by Reuters here). 

The curtailment of the freedom of speech and expression by the government and thus taking away the right to get information from the residents of the state has led to the ‘questioning of the idea of democracy’ in the Indian Constitution because the Right to Information is inherently mentioned in the text of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution (see Swapnil Tripathy v. Supreme Court of India and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India) and the violation of which would obviously make the citizens question it. Many appeals and complaints were being filed not only before the judiciary but also before the State Information Commission but there were no fruits.

Conclusion

The Right to Information has been recognized by the judiciary as a fundamental right under the Freedom of Speech and Expression. In the age where the whole world is solely dependent on the information from the media, its value can be easily associated with the socio-cultural, economic and political development of a country like India. The Right to information is important because it is at present the basis of the development. The right to know something is also closely related to the Right to Education as stated under the Article 21-A of the Indian Constitution. Thus, the following right should be attributed to every citizen as it is a part of personal liberty and it is essential to form an informed opinion. The access to information should be equated and kept into account that it is guaranteed and treated as a norm (and not an exception). As in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the rest of the country should raise their voice and every ounce of information must be circulated thoroughly so that the drastic condition of the residents comes into notice of the whole world. For it is always said, “unity is the strength of India”. The Right to Information should aim at providing transparency of the administration as well as public life.