Welcome to Constitutional Renaissance

The blog aims to simplify the intricacies of Constitutional Law and explain diverse issues through the lens of the Constitution. We seek to glorify the democratic spirit of the Constitution and imbibe Constitutional Objectivity in every citizen. The primary focus – though not exclusive- of this blog is upon the text, history, philosophy, interpretation, and values of the Constitution. Join our initiative and connect with us.

We have established a Database to help researchers and policymakers better understand the existing scholarship in Constitutional Law and to work together to fill the existing gaps.

(Click here to enter our database)

We invite guest essays from students, academicians, practising lawyers and everyone else! We’d love non-law background people to bring in their own diverse and unique perspective to the blog; please write for us, and click here to view our guest-post guidelines.

History of Article 326: Why did India choose Universal Adult Franchise?

Article 326 of the Indian Constitution states there every citizen of India who is not less than 18 years of age shall be entitled to be registered as a voter. The Constitution or any law made by the Parliament such as Representation of Peoples’ Act can restrict a citizen to be a registered as a voter only on the grounds of ‘non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practices’. But before the Constitution was enacted there were several reservations against Article 326 of the Constitution. In this article, the author will analyse the reasons which made the founding fathers choose a universal adult franchise over the limited franchise.

India’s History and the Committee Reports

When India attained independence in August 1947, the citizens were lacking basic standards of education and literacy. They were divided broadly into different classes, linguistic and religious groups. Ivor Jennings, a constitutional thinker, advised that India must create a limited franchise. Even the Report on Indian Constitutional Reform of 1918 recommended what Ivor Jennings advised- a limited franchise. It was in 1930 that the Report on Indian Statutory Commission recommended ‘an extension of the vote to correspond to growth in adult literacy. This was a colonial logic which was based on the assumption that only the educated masses can vote in a democracy. Even the Report of the Indian Franchise Committee which was published in 1932 recommended that uneducated and illiterate masses don’t have an informed ‘outlook towards public affairs and political participation’.

The Indian organisations such as the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League were mostly divided on issues of power in the colonial administration. It was the Motilal Nehru Committee of 1928 which responded to the Commission reports by demanding a Universal Franchise for free India. The logic of the Committee report was that the exclusion of those who are kept out of franchise will be harmed and they might ‘de-legitimise’ the democratically elected government as well because those in power will not be their ‘own‘ representatives. Even the Sapru Committee in 1945 advocated for Universal Adult Franchise. The Sapru Committee observed that the substantial changes can be made only if there is full responsibility accredited to the government. There must be a fear of getting voted out from power. If those in power will know that a certain section of the society will not decide their fate in the next election, then they will not work for the welfare of that section as those citizens are denied voting rights. Hence, the ‘Indian’ committees recommended for Universal Franchise as opposed to the committees made by the Englishmen.

 De Facto exclusion of Lower Caste

During the colonial period and even before that, the citizens belonging to the so-called lower castes were not allowed to attain education and they were forced to do odd-jobs. Education was for the elite and the ‘upper castes’. Dr B.R. Ambedkar aware of this fact pressed for inclusion of lower caste in the franchise as ‘qualifications based on education and property during colonial rule meant the de facto exclusion of the lower caste’. For Ambedkar, who negotiated with the colonial rulers, right to vote became a focal point as he believed that ‘suffrage could itself serve an instructive role and that participation in political life would bring about consciousness among the lower castes’. As L.T. Hobhouse says in his work 1911 text Liberalism that “the success of democracy depends on the response of the voters to the opportunities given to them. But, conversely, the opportunities must be given in order to call forth that response”. To Ambedkar, the right to vote was not a privilege but a right! He believed that if it is treated as a privilege then “political emancipation of the un-enfranchised will be entirely at the mercy of those that are enfranchised”.  For ‘lower caste’, first, education was denied and then, the franchise was denied because of education. Hence, if education was kept as a criterion then it would have been erroneous and arbitrary.

Participatory Democracy and Adult Franchise

As Madhav Khosla in his book says “the apparent relationship between restrictions in the franchise and good governance had little truth”. A Parliament without any reform that is to say the inclusion of all sections of society is “not a blessing to anyone”. Democracy and participation are like Vikram and Betaal, where ‘democracy is solely about the expression of preferences at the ballot box’. Participation in an election is equivalent to the removal of isolation of a person because when a person casts her vote, she feels that her voice is being heard and she is there in the law-making process (through her representative) which will be governing her behaviour in a democratic society. ‘If democracy was about shaping the associations in one’s life, a limitation on suffrage would place the lower classes under the control of the powerful. It would mean that such classes would be deprived of the chance to shape interactions in their life.’ Putting limitations on suffrage is a form of coercion on someone’s right.

In Conclusion

Some members of the constituent assembly, like Thirumala Rao, considered universal adult franchise as ‘a dangerous weapon’ and Mahavir Tyagi considered it a ‘monstrous experiment’. K.T. Shah, a celebrated personality in the Assembly, stated that imposition of literacy as a requirement for the franchise would ‘ensure better governance’. But such a model will discourage the government from creating and spreading education and literacy among the illiterate classes as those classes might vote-out the government in the future elections if their demands are not met.

The Assembly ignored the idea of the limited franchise. The founding fathers chose universal adult franchise over limited franchise giving every citizen (who is above 18 years of age) a Right to Vote. A citizen has a right to express her opinion at the ballot box after every five years and choose their representatives. It is the most celebrated rights in the Indian Constitution which allow the marginalised and the ill-treated communities to choose the fate of their leaders. The country chose to tackle the issues of illiteracy among others by universal adult franchise!

[The author would like to thank Professor Madhav Khosla for his book “India’s Founding Moment: The Constitution of a Most Surprising Democracy” and the single quotes used in this article are from his book only.]

Hate Speech vs Free Speech: Where is the current strongest?

[This is a post by Diksha Dadu, Contributing Member]

In this blog, I will be focusing upon the legal provisions with respect to the concept of Hate Speech by critically analyzing Indian precedents and certain foreign judgments to differentiate between discussion and the advocacy of incitement acts which are considered prejudicial to maintenance of peace and harmony. Furthermore, I will be enunciating upon an effort to find a transformative yet harmonious approach in relation to hate speech on Freedom of Expression and examining the restriction thereof, followed by the conclusion.

Introduction

“…[T]hat the law shall be certain, and that it shall be just and shall move with the times.”Lord Reid, Judge as Law Maker

The disparity in jurisprudence on hate speech has been considered as remotely distant in Indian Constitutional Law while the terrain of free speech still remains a contested field. “Hate speech is termed as the speech that carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some group, such as a particular race, especially in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence”, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary. According to Article 19(1)(a), the right to freedom of speech and expression is granted to every citizen of democratic India. However, the constitution also provides for the reasonable restrictions against free speech in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence under Article 19(2) of The Constitution of India. The 2017 Law Commission Report, No. 267 recommended the introduction of new provisions within the penal code that specifically punish incitement to violence in addition to the existing ones while examining the scope of hate speech laws in India. Moreover, free speech is considered quintessential for every democracy to work efficiently. The doctrine of free speech has evolved as a bulwark against the state’s power to regulate speech. The liberal doctrine was a measure against the undemocratic power of the state.

Thus, this gives us an inference upon the reflection and attitude of our legislature and the juncture of decision making by the judiciary towards the issue of hate speech and the real extent of its reasonable restrictions thereof.

Hate Speech: Regulations and Legal Provisions in India 

In a democratic country like India which possess diverse communities of people, castes, creed, religions and languages as its unique nature, the principle of autonomy and free speech does not malign properly and wholly. This idiosyncratic nature of our Indian structure is one of the greatest challenges before the principle of autonomy and free speech principle. There is a constant battle of opinions to ensure that this liberty is not exercised to the detriment of any individual or the disadvantaged group or section of the society. 

As per the Indian Penal Code, the concept of hate speech constitutes under Section 153A, which is the offence of promoting communal disharmony or feelings of hatred between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 categorizes the offence of promoting religious, racist, linguistic, community or caste hatred or incites any religious, caste or any other disharmony or enmity within India, through any speech either in written form or spoken, Section 298 also classifies the offence of uttering words with the deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person, Section 505 similarly criminalizes the act of delivering speeches that incite violence. As per the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 123(3A) also criminalizes hate speech of candidates contesting elections. 
In 2014, a Public Interest Litigation was filed before the Supreme Court of India seeking guidelines on hate speech during elections. It observed that hate speech attempts to marginalize individuals on the basis of their membership in a group which impacts such people socially by diminishing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, the Court observed, lays the groundwork for aggravated attacks on the vulnerable communities in the future. This weakens the ability of people to participate wholly in a democracy. It was further observed that the existing laws in India were sufficient to tackle hate speeches. The root of the problem is not the absence of laws but rather a lack of their effective execution, the Court reiterated.

Analysis of Hate Speech in India: Extent of Reasonable Restriction Principle and Position of State

The issue of the validity of hate speech laws and the extent of already existing hate speech laws has always been a heated debate in India. This issue has time and again raised before the legislature, court as well as the public. Under Article 19(2), the hate speech can be curtailed on the grounds of public order, incitement to offence and security of the State. In the infamous case of Ram Manohar Lohiya v. State of Bihar, the Apex Court observed that “One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represent the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not the security of the State.” The standard approach applied for restricting Article 19(1)(a) is the highest when imposed in the interest of the security of the State. 

Further, the Supreme Court while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 295A IPC ruled that this section does not penalize every act of insult or attempt to ‘insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalizes only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.’ It was held that if an act does not actually cause a breach of public order, its restriction ‘in the interest of public order’ will be deemed reasonable with respect to Article 19(2), since it has a much wider connotation than interest and maintenance of public order. 

In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the court observed that expression could only be restricted when discussion and advocacy amounted to incitement, however, when no ingredient in offence of inciting anybody to do anything which a reasonable man would then the tendency of being an immediate threat to public safety or tranquillity would diminish. Therefore, the context of speech plays a vital role in determining its legitimacy under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and that our commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered.

Hence, after analyzing the recent landmark decisions, it could be re-iterated that a speech protective regime has been followed in India. The main cause of action behind such a stance is the apprehension and fear of misuse of restrictive statutes by the State. Such a regime has been followed in the United States and the Courts therein are extremely cautious in restricting Article 19 of the Constitution to avoid vitriolic approaches from the public. Pluralism, tolerance, peace and non-discrimination have been termed non-derogatory values by the ECHR in ascertaining the extent of free speech allowed under the Convention.

Conclusion

Hate speech poses a complex situation against freedom of speech and expression. The constitutional approach to these challenges has been far from uniform as the boundaries between impermissible propagation of hatred and protected speech vary across jurisdictions. 

In a landmark judgment of Canada v Taylor, the constitutional validity of hate speech laws was challenged since it violated the right to freedom of speech and expression. It was held that hate and propaganda contribute little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada in the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self‑development, or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged. The Supreme Court of Canada opined that hate speech laws are indeed a part of the global commitment to eradicate racism and communal disharmony. 

However, ‘with every right comes responsibility’; and therein, is the need for a limitation on the right to freedom of speech and expression so as to prevent the destructive and regressive effect it could have. There is a massive need to revise and amend the existing anti-discrimination legislation with respect to hate speech without curtailing the freedom of speech and expression of people. Laws should be implemented in a non-selective, non-arbitrary and transparent manner, along the lines of golden principles of the constitution which should not be used to stifle dissent or the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Lastly, the fight against hate speech should not be pursued in isolation but with a harmonious holistic approach. Our constitutional history must be maligned with the traditional approaches along the lines of recent development and usage of hate speech laws, especially in terms of yellow journalism these days. With excessive interference of the media into the facts and evidence of the case has led the judiciary to negatively view such journalists as ‘thought intelligentsia’, which in turn impacts the justice delivery system as well. Therefore, a harmonious balance must be drawn while dealing with such matters and reasonable restrictions must be applied and followed strictly and not liberally in our diverse democratic country.

Case Study on State Assemblies of North East India: Need for Reservations for Women

[Editorial Note: Constitutional Renaissance’s Research on State assemblies of North East can be accessed here]

In this article, we conducted a research on the incumbent Members of Legislative Assembly (‘MLAs’) in eight states of North East (Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Meghalaya and Nagaland) as a sample data to analyse the number of women MLA in these regions, their family backgrounds, political parties and their income, whether they are from a relatively poor or rich background (click here to see our summarised research). This research tries to answer the question “whether women are proportionally represented in the State Assemblies according to their population in the state.” As the Tribune reports, ‘the Perception of Electoral Integrity Index gave India 40/100, under the Varieties of Democracy’s Female Rights Index, with India performing its lowest in political power. In the EIU’s Democracy Index (2019), India suffered a downfall in political participation from 7.22 to 6.67.’ Currently, in-state assembly elections, there is no proportional reservation for women, unlike in the third tier of government (Panchayats) where we have 33% reservation for women. Through this research, we will be proposing that there is a requirement for proportional reservation for women in the state assemblies and in Parliament to avoid ‘political lockout’ and to keep our democracy legitimate.

Liberal Constitution and ‘political lockout’

In liberal constitutions, like that of India, the state has an indispensable duty to protect the rights of the citizens and to ensure that the freedoms and civil liberties are not compromised at any cost. Although the denial of these civil liberties presents many stability problems for democracy. But ‘political lockout’ of a section of society out of power raises concerns with regard to the whole legitimacy of the democracy. That section of society could be Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes or women as well. In the words of Tarunabh Khaitan, political lockout means ‘when a group comprehensively loses any genuine prospects of garnering even a threshold level of political power at least some of the time, it has been ‘locked out’ of power’. We have always thought of political representation debate with regard to caste and religion. But keeping a whole group, which is women, out of politics may also repose serious threat to the legitimacy of the liberal order established by the Constitution. For instance, if a particular group is kept out of power for long and they are refused to participate in decisions which affect their lives, then that group will lose faith in the democracy as their interests are not fulfilled either represented in the law-making body. We have seen in the past when committees are formed for a particular purpose but they keep out a section of a society which are the most affected section, then it raises alarming concerns about that committee, to an extend delegitimizing it (for instance, see this). Through our research, we have found that women in north-east have been kept out of power for some time and they have been denied equal participation in the law-making process. In the northeast alone, out of 498 seats (MLAs) spread over eight different states, there are only 24 elected women representatives.

The research displays a lot of flustering concerns: about the legitimacy of democracy. Scholar Choudhary argues in his book that

‘the ambition of liberal constitutionalism is that a constitutional order must both be legitimate and must enjoy the allegiance of a sufficient number of its citizens.’

If a group, be it, women, any caste, any class, is kept out of power for some time then ‘that has the capacity to destabilise the constitutional settlement’. Through our research, we saw that the women who are in politics, and who become MLAs, are relatively richer to those women who do not get into politics. The data shows that all of the women MLAs who get elected are relatively richer with assets ranging from Rs. 1,49,77,798 (of a member from Tripura) to Rs. 1,86,28,851 (of a member from Assam). The plight of a woman who is not relatively rich and is not represented in the law-making process is so much that it might make the state assemblies illegitimate and no longer liberal as it does not represent democracy, rather a ‘plutocracy’. Plutocracy is a society that is ruled or controlled by people of great wealth or income. A majority group, who is relatively poor, is kept out of power.

Research shows us that there are no single women in all the states who are ‘relatively poor’ as compared to others. The MLA with the lowest income among all of them is from Tripura (CPI(M) party) who has assets worth Rs. 7,05,142 (But we never know if this has increased after getting elected as an MLA). If a set of group, which has a defining characteristic that is relatively poor and not-men, is kept out of political power (even the minimum share of power), then ‘the guarantee of fair political opportunity has been compromised’ (see Tarun Khaitan’s research). If need to make a democracy legitimate of authority beyond the formal declaration of ‘free and fair elections’, we must address the issues of ‘political lockout’, under-representation and every group must get a chance to represent itself in the position of power.

As Geetika Dang, Research analyst from Brookings India put it ‘while Mizoram has never elected a female member Parliament [as also shown through our research even in the case of state assemblies], perhaps the starkest example of the lack of female representation comes from Nagaland that has failed to elect a single female MLA in 55 years of statehood. Rano Shaiza, a member of United Democratic Party, was the first and only woman in this state who was elected to Lok Sabha in 1977.’ Our research shows that currently in Mizoram and Nagaland there are no women MLAs in an area where the population of women is 5.41 lakhs and 9.53 lakhs respectively. There is no state in North East India which does not regularly make laws for women but the voices of the women are not heard in the halls of the legislature as there is no one to represent them. Further, the data from Manipur raises more alarming concerns as for 14.17 lakhs women, there is only one MLA.

We also found something interesting that out of these total 24 elected MLAs in the North East region, only 4 of them have some kind of political background. Rest of them did not have any sort of political background, neither their husbands nor their parents are in politics. This shows a positive trend that women are becoming independent and without any political support, they are standing up and coming into a profession which is termed as ‘dirty’ in common parlance (but we are not sure about their political connection through other connections).

Although, it is true that every woman in North-East have a right to vote guaranteed by the Constitution, but just formal declaration of equality cannot justify the inequality faced by women in the law-making process (or even in their share of political power). Hence, there is a need for a minimum reservation of seats for women in the legislative assemblies.

 Answering the ‘inequality’ in Representation: A ‘Localised’ Solution?

One of the methods to ensure women representation in North-East region is by making sure all the women come together to support other women, basically lobby the support. This needs to be done through the Gandhian methods of localising the issues and answering them through a bottoms-up approach. As Simi Malhotra, Director of the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, Jamia Millia Islamia, said in a Development Seminar in 2019 that, “the paternalistic baggage of ethnicity, and hence the ethnic divide within the northeastern states, has been an impediment in this direction.  At the grassroots level, the women’s movement in the northeast and associated synergies and outlets of solidarity have to be explored.” But this casts another issue which is inevitable that only those women who are relatively richer will be able to organise women and get the support like how we see in national politics. Even the first generation politicians have strong economical backing. We hardly see any MP or MLA from a relatively poor background. As we have seen through our research that most of the women who are elected as MLAs are from an economically richer section of society.

Further, this, bottoms-up approach, is not an absolute guarantee that women will be represented in the assembly because keeping women out of politics is not just a problem of political parties who do not give chance to women, but also a constitutional and a social problem. The preamble uses the words ‘We the People’ gives ourselves this constitution, but if the ‘supreme document’ cannot guarantee a group minimum power in the political machinery, then the faith of that group would be shaken and hence, the problems need constitutional insurance/reservations.

‘Political Assurance’: Proportionate Reservation

Political empowerment of women is a necessity in eliminating gender inequality and discrimination. Political power is a (sort) of guarantee to the women which will ensure that the elected regime remains legitimate addressing all the issues related to women. If we look at the historical account of the efforts made to reserve seats for women in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, we can trace a ‘background note’ by the Law Ministry which shows that efforts made to reserve seats for women in State Assemblies and House of People always failed due to lack of political consensus.

Again in 2008, Rajya Sabha’s Department related to Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, public grievances, law and justice presented its 36th Report on The Constitution (One Hundred and Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2008 in which the committee recommended for proportionate reservation for women in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. Further AIDMK member orally stated before the committee on the need for reservation for women.

Reservation for women is not a bounty but it is an honest recognition of their contribution to social development and to the society at large.

We have seen the justices of the High Court in the past few years (as well) making “misogynistic observations” in cases involving penal sections like Rape, Assault etc. It shows the mindset of the society towards the women that is horrific and has no place in the 21st century and it enhances the need for a political assurance as ‘there is no logic in saying that women are deficient in physical, mental and intellectual capabilities. Still, they have been forced to be earmarked as the weaker sections of the society. In fact, by keeping 50 per cent of the society weaker we have made the whole society weak. In such a situation, some compulsory legislative measures need to be taken for proportionate representation of the women in the State Assemblies and the Lok Sabha as well.’

The arguments against the reservation of women state that women empowerment cannot be done through such measures, instead, we need a societal change where everyone changes from within. But such ‘Gandhian’ bottom’s up approach fails in the long run as the people do not have an incentive to change their attitude and behaviour towards the other gender. Rather, constitutional insurances which guarantee formal equality accelerates the ‘process of change’ in the society as seen in the case and experiment of Reservation of 33% for women in Panchayati Raj. The Committee which recommended the reservation for women also observed that ‘the data shows that through 1/3rd reservation of seats for women in Panchayats and Nagarpalikas, they have been able to make meaningful contributions and that the actual representation of women in Panchayati Raj institutions has gone up to 42.3% i.e., beyond the reservation percentage.’

Impossibility of Reservation in Rajya Sabha: ‘Article 80 of the Constitution specifies that members of state assemblies will elect Rajya Sabha MPs through a single transferable vote.  This implies that the votes are first allocated to the most preferred candidate, and then to the next preferred candidate, and so on.  This system cannot accommodate the principle of reserving a certain number of seats for a particular group.  Currently, Rajya Sabha does not have a reservation for SCs and STs. Therefore, any system that provides reservation in Rajya Sabha implies that the Constitution must be amended to jettison the Single Transferable Vote system.’

Anyhow, leaving the Rajya Sabha aside, the Preamble of the Indian Constitution states and guarantees that every citizen must be secured of ‘equality of status and opportunity’. These commitments in the Preamble must be the objective of the legislature which they must seek to achieve while enacting an amendment for reservation of women. The data shows that the women are not represented equally in the Assemblies and there is a need for change, or else questions against the legitimacy of the democracy will strengthen. Equality for women is not just a game of mockery and gimmickry for ‘International women’s day’, but it is a continuous effort to eradicate various social, economic and political gaps between the genders.

This is a research conducted by Chaitanya Singh, Founder and Editor of Constitutional Renaissance Blog. The author would like to thank Ms Raksha Tripathy, Ms Sulagna Sarkar and Mr Yuvraj Ranolia for assisting in data analysis and research.

Understanding the Right to Privacy: The Puttaswamy Judgment-I

In 2017, the 9 judges of the Indian Supreme Court adjudicated a matter Puttaswamy v. Union of India (‘Puttaswamy’) and unanimously held that under the Indian Constitution, the Right to Privacy is a fundamental right. The Supreme Court declared that its previous judgments in MP Sharma (8 judges) and Kharak Singh (6 judges) are overruled as they did not recognise privacy as a fundamental right. Those judgments relied on the logic used in the A.K. Gopalan case which stated that every fundamental right to be read separately and individually. But that position got changed in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, and subsequently in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, in which the Court held that fundamental rights cannot be read in water-tight compartments. In Cooper, the Court said that the fundamental rights ‘do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights’, rather they are interlinked. Hence, this article must be read in light of the principle enunciated in the Cooper case. In this article, I will try to highlight the reasoning behind Puttaswamy as to why the Court declared Right to Privacy as a fundamental right.

Understanding Right to Life and Dignity

Every human being by the virtue of her existence has a Right to Life which is a natural right guaranteed by the ‘Nature’. Further, this natural right to life is also guaranteed by the Indian Constitution under Article 21 which elucidates that the ‘state’ shall not violate any person’s right to life and personal liberty without the procedure established by law. The Right to life is not just the right of a person’s physical body, but also over her mental being. In Golaknath case, Justice Rao observed that ‘Fundamental Rights are the modern name for what has been traditionally known as Natural Rights’ [The usage of the word ‘natural’ here is opposed to the societal opinion/understanding of the rights ‘as they are since time immemorial’, rather it is based on the transformative nature of rights which are always evolving]. These rights, including the right to life, cannot be excluded or separated from human existence. Hence, the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are the natural rights of every human being, which it aims to preserve.

Dignity, as an expression, finds its place in the Preamble of the Constitution as it states that ‘ensuring the dignity of every individual’. An individual is the focal point of the Constitution and human dignity weaves through the provisions of the Constitution. [Article 14: Guarantee against arbitrariness; Article 19: Individual Freedoms; Article 21: Life and personal liberty] The Court in the Francis Mullin case strongly observed that the fundamental rights must be interpreted to enhance the human dignity and ‘worth of the human person’. The Right to Life is not just animal existence and it is much more than just mere survival. On human dignity, the five-judges bench in M. Nagraj exposits that, “no exact definition of human dignity exists. It refers to the intrinsic value of every human being, which is to be respected. It cannot be taken away. Every human being has dignity by virtue of his existence.” Further, observing about dignity, it has been observed in Selvi’s Case that forcible intrusion into a person’s mental processes is also a violation of Human Dignity.

Privacy and Human Dignity

Ancient philosophers such as Aristotle distinguishes private life from public life. He distinguishes the spheres where the government can intervene and where it cannot; certainly as he observes that government cannot intervene in an individual’s privacy.  Individual’s private life is mainly for “private reflection, familial relations and self-determination” (refer to the constitutional database to read the hyperlinked article). The individual is sovereign over her mind and body. As Justice Chandrachud posits (Puttaswamy ¶32),

“If the reason for protecting privacy is the dignity of the individual, the rationale for its existence does not cease merely because the individual has to interact with others in the public arena.”

An individual has all the freedom and liberty over his body and mind and she must be set free from any kind of intrusion. Privacy, as a right, is important for an individual to exercise control over his or her personality. ‘Privacy ensures that a human being can lead a life of dignity by securing the inner recesses of the human personality from unwanted intrusion.’ (Puttaswamy ¶113) Life without dignity, privacy and liberty is no life as they are inalienable to a human being. No state can violate these rights as they exist even before the advent of the Constitution. The constitution is ‘not the sole repository of the right to life.’ India has signed and ratified UDHR and its Article 12 recognises the Right to Privacy which cannot be taken away by anyone.

 Further, the argument that the right to privacy is not available under the text of the Constitution is based on a primitive understanding of it. The Constitution is a transformative text which evolves over time and it cannot be viewed as a document ‘written in ink to replace one legal regime with another’. It is a document which rests on the goals enshrined in the Preamble and the aim is to realise those goals. The Constitution does not tells us what is a right or do we have a right or not? It only puts the limitations on the power of the state. It is not the source of liberty of man as liberty exists by the mere virtue of existence in the world.

Therefore, the right to privacy is a part of the liberty of an individual and privacy protects the individual’s autonomy and dignity. The ‘pursuit of happiness’ which everyone seeks is founded upon liberty and dignity of an individual. ‘Both are essential attributes of privacy which makes no distinction between the birthmarks of an individual.’ The guarantee of the right to privacy liberates the individual and helps her in realising her potential and autonomy.

In conclusion, while embracing the Supreme Court’s judgment in Puttaswamy v. Union of India, a paragraph from Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (2015) is something to look forward to:

“The right to privacy can be both negatively and positively defined. The negative right to privacy entails the individuals are protected from unwanted intrusion by both the state and private actors into their private life, especially features that define their personal identity such as sexuality, religion and political affiliation, i.e., the inner core of a person’s private life….. The positive right to privacy entails an obligation of states to remove obstacles for an autonomous shaping of individual identities.”

[Note: There are certain reservations about the Court’s judgment with regard to ‘declaring Privacy as a Natural Right and not merely a Fundamental Right’. This has been argued here and here]

Protection of Animal rights under the Indian Constitution

[This is a post by Suvechha Sarkar, Contributing Member]

The whole world is under great threat as a result of the drastic climate change that has been happening for the last three decades. The global warming and the extinction of many animal and plant species have been something which could not be overlooked due to the adverse condition which we are facing in our day to day lives. The most threatened part of nature is that of the trees and animals. In the 21st century,  animal managers have been facing greater and bigger problems as compared to ever. They constantly have to keep up with their inventive and innovative sides.

In India, in the past 10 years, there has been a gradual rise in the number of cruelties against animals. It must be stated as the shame of humanity, especially in India where animals are being worshipped. There are provisions in the Indian Constitution, in the Indian Penal Code which lays down laws against the brutalities against animals but the question remains how strict the laws are.

Laws in India regarding the Rights and Welfare of animals

The Indian Constitution lays down some of the Animal Rights under the Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Duties and the Directive Principles of State Policy. Apart from these the rest of the laws and punishments concerning animal rights are listed in Section 428 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, 1974, the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

SECTION 428 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

The following act states that if someone causes any harm or mischief by killing or injuring any animal, by any means the value of which is ten rupees or more than that is entitled to maximum 2 years of imprisonment and may be entitled with fine or maybe with both.

SECTION 429 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1872

Whoever causes any mischief by killing or injuring any elephant, camel, horse, mule, buffalo, ox, cow or bull or any other animal by any means, the value of which may be fifty rupees or more, the person will be entitled with a punishment of imprisonment for a maximum of 5 years or with fine or maybe both.

SECTION 154 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973

A person can file for an FIR against the cruelties towards animals or protect the animal rights, in the nearest or local police station under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The person under fault will be punished accordingly considering the offence he committed falls under the cognizable or non-cognizable offence.

THE WILDLIFE PROTECTION ACT, 1972

Under this following act, injuries to both the trees and the wild animals are being prohibited (under Section 39). In the list of wild animals, it consists of all animals including the mammals, birds and the reptiles. For the case of reptiles and the birds, even their eggs fall under the protection of this Act. The punishment for the first offence under this act is imprisonment for three years or maybe a fine of twenty-five thousand rupees or maybe both. For the second offence under this following act, the imprisonment is for a term of seven years with a fine amount of ten thousand rupees.

THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1960

Under this following Act, the law states protect the animals from the cruelties like slaughtering, transportation, cruelty against a pet or not providing an animal with the needed living condition etc. The punishment for the first offence under this act is a fine of a maximum of fifty rupees and in the case of a second offence, the person can be punished with maximum three-month imprisonment or fine of minimum twenty-five rupees and a maximum of hundred rupees. In some cases, it can lead to both at the same time.

Animal rights and the Indian Constitution

Fundamental Rights

The fundamental rights stated in the Constitution of India (Part III) lays down the rights of every citizen of India irrespective of the caste, creed, colour, race, place or religion. The main question which can be raised is what rights do the animals have when it is not only the people who are living in this country. The only fundamental right which can be used for fighting towards the rights of animals is that of Article 21 which is the Right to Life. Article 21 states “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.”

In the case of Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja & Ors., the Supreme Court had introduced some of the animal rights under the following article thus expanding its scope on a large scale. The case was filed against the game of Jallikattu which involved the use of bulls. Across the years, the game had led to the death of many humans along with the concerns for the welfare of these bulls as during the ongoing of the game, they were injured with sticks, knives in order to win. It was in this case, the Supreme Court passed the order in favour of the Animal Welfare Board of India. As a result, the game was banned. The court stated that “Article 51 A (g) of the Constitution is the “Magna Carta of animal rights” and made several observations to safeguard the “life” of animals under Article 21.

Directive Principles of State Policy

The directive principles are enshrined in Part IV of the Indian Constitution. It consists of fifteen principles which are in no way enforceable in the court of law and in a way helps the states to formulate its laws and policies. Article 48 and Article 48A of the Indian Constitution lays down the principles concerning the welfare of the animals and their rights. The following article talks about the problems regarding the cow slaughter. India is a country where cows are worshipped by people of many religions and considered sacred on a separate level. It states that the farmers or the farms should take enough care of the farm animals especially the cattle. It is stated that the farms should put the effort into making the breed better.

This particular provision prohibiting the slaughter of cows had been a matter of hot debate among the Constituent Assembly members. It was argued if it could be added under the list of the fundamental rights or not but ultimately it was decided to be added to the directive principles since it was in contradiction with the Article 9 of the Indian Constitution which stated the Right to Religion. In the case of Mohd. Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar (1959), the court dealt with the same problem. The judgement went in the favor of Article 9 observing that the banning of cow slaughter was next to impossible keeping in mind the diverse religious practices of the Indian citizen.

Fundamental Duties

The fundamental duties pertaining to the protection of animal rights are found in Article 51A, part IV of the Indian Constitution. Just like the directive principles of the State Policy, the fundamental duties are unenforceable in the Court of Law. Only two of the clauses in Article 51A of the Constitution consists of laws which are in concern of animal welfare. It is stated as follows:

“(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures;

(h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform.”

Conclusion

There has been an increase in the reports of cases concerning animal abuse and cruelties. As the year 2020 is passing by inside the four walls of our rooms, it is becoming more evident how the caged animals might feel. From cases of poaching to trapping them cruelly in iron traps or ropes, thus injuring them, to the cases of beating the stray dogs or poisoning them, beating them to death, the existence of humanity is constantly being questioned. It is not only the duty of Law to protect the animals. It also depends on us who are sharing the planet with them.

At the present situation, millions of rabbits, mice and various other animals are being used for various scientific experiments. They tend to develop various problems which are not only associated with their physique but also their mind. We need to understand that it’s not only the humans who are affected under the cu=ircumstances of loneliness but also them. The experiments usually involve usage of various drugs over them or even cutting them open in various instances. Many organizations have already been protesting against it but the use of certain animals for experimentation is still legal in all countries. The law should be reformed so that this cruel practice can be stopped because at the end all lives matter, be it humans or animals. 

The Indian Laws are constantly developed for the protection of the animals and their welfare but unlike some other countries, the animal laws in our country are far less rigid and as a result, many people are getting away with their act of cruelty. More amendments should be brought in the Constitution of India listing Articles in the context of animal protection and rights. It is indeed a crucial moment for us to prove that humanity still exists among us and has not faded away.

“Publishing of notice of Intended Marriage”: A Privacy loophole under Special Marriage Act

[This is a post by Shreya Singh, Contributing Member.]

Marriage is considered as a sacred institution in India which is governed by codified personal laws. The Supreme Court of India has recently accepted a petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 6 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 contending that the provision violates the Right to privacy, equality and non-discrimination vested in the Constitution of India. The Special Marriage Act, 1954 is distinct from other personal laws as it provides rules and regulations regarding marriage for the people of India and all Indian nationals in foreign countries, irrespective of the religion or faith followed by either party.

The Apex court has agreed to examine the provisions which obligate the Marriage Officer to publish a notice of an intended marriage allowing people to come forward and object the intended marriage within 30 days of the date of publication of the notice. The details include their names, date of birth, age, occupation, parents’ names and details, address, pin code, identity information, phone number, etc. which is a particular requirement of the Act. It also mentions that anyone can raise an objection to the marriage, and gives significant power to the marriage officer to investigate them as well.

The provision invades privacy and violates fundamental rights 

The right to privacy was recognised by the Supreme Court in the nine-judge bench landmark judgement in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017). The Supreme court declared that right to privacy is a fundamental right and is an intrinsic part of the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, contending that it is the responsibility of the sovereign State/Nation to protect the privacy of an individual. Therefore, the State must not intervene in the personal lives of the people and the choices made by them which includes a person’s decision of whom he/she should marry. On the contrary, the said provisions of the Special marriage act, 1954 obligates the marriage officer to put personal details of the couple in the public domain for other people to decide whether the potential solemnisation of marriage is acceptable or not. 

The notice of marriage not only invades the private lives and liberty of the individuals but also jeopardizes the marriage as it may endanger the life or limb of the couple due to parental interference. In the case of Lata Singh v State of UP (2006), a two-judge bench of the apex court, in the landmark judgement stated as follows:

“This is a free and democratic country, and once a person becomes a major he or she can marry whosoever he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not approve of such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage the maximum they can do is that they can cut off social relations with the son or the daughter, but they cannot give threats or commit or instigate acts of violence.”

In the case of Shakti Vahini v. Union of India(2018), the Supreme court held that the right to choose a life partner is a fundamental right under Article 21 and does not require the consent of anyone else other than the two legally competent persons (adults) for the solemnisation of marriage. The disclosure of marriage between inter-faith/inter-caste couples can invite religious conflicts amongst both the communities and may lead to physical violence and honour killings. A prominent example of such violence is the Khaap Panchayat in western Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Delhi and the honour killings practised by them. The publishing of intended marriage mentioned in the Special Marriage Act may attract such communal conflicts and unfortunate blood-shed which will only create hatred amongst religious communities. 

It is observed that there is an inconsistency in the personal laws for the solemnisation of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act,1955, does not demand a notice of intended marriage to be published which is contrary to the Special Marriage Act, 1954. This clearly proves the arbitrary nature of the laws and its failure in satisfying reasonable classification under Article 14 of the Constitution. The provision also violates Article 15 of the constitution of India as it promotes inequality in the society and discriminates people on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste and place of birth. 

Uniform Civil Code: Need of the hour 

The conflicting provisions in the personal laws have been a prominent issue in India. The conflicting requirements of multiple laws create unnecessary confusion in the judiciary and give rise to the arbitrary nature of judgements. The establishment of a Uniform Civil Code can bring relief to conflicts regarding the inconsistency of personal laws as it will apply equally to all the citizens of India regardless of their religion. It would help in bringing about a positive change in society by preventing communal violence and maintaining peace and harmony. 

Conclusion 

In India, marriage is hardly considered as a private affair between two consenting adults. It is believed in India that – “Marriage isn’t a union of two people; but the union of two communities/families”. Marriage is still a victim of patriarchy as it is driven by the notion that choosing a desired partner against the standards that have been set by society is unacceptable. The romanticisation of marriage being a topic of communal-union must not penetrate and affect the private lives and the choices made by individuals. 

There have been progressive decisions made by the state of Kerala regarding this issue as they have recently issued a circular to bring a halt to the publication of notice of marriage and this has been supported by high courts of Delhi and Rajasthan as well. The Supreme court must consider these progressive examples to make a rational decision and help in bringing about a significant change in Indian society. 

EIA Draft 2020 and Constitutional Concerns

[This is a post by Minnah AbrahamContributing Editor]

Introduction

Noting the several holes piercing right through EIA draft 2020, several concerns were immediately raised, questioning India’s obligations towards the larger interest of the general public, with its disturbing clauses, especially the removal of public consultations and the insertion of ‘post-facto clearance’. Not to mention that the draft was made to be available only in English and Hindi initially, which goes against the very principles of democracy, pertaining to the duty enshrined to the government to take the draft law to its people. This, however, is another concern, where a serious amendment is necessary in the Official Language Act for the government to issue draft laws and notices in regional languages. 

Coming back to the EIA Draft 2020, this draft law weakens India’s position toward environmental protection and upholding the Constitutional Article 48A, forsaking the duty of the State to protect, improve and safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country.

EIA Draft 2020

The Environment Impact Assessment 2020 is condemned as supportive of ventures on the grounds that the draft permits post-facto clearance meaning the concerned authorities can affirm an undertaking with no adequate formalities. This further implies the onus of acceptance of infringement lies on the polluter and the polluter can look for clearance after it has started work and has just caused ecological damages. There are just about 40 distinct undertakings that are barred from the natural leeway and public discussion in this way shouldn’t be affirmed dependent on the assurance and climate wellbeing rules. The exception is material to: 

  • Those tasks that are sorted as key by the legislature. 
  • Citizens cannot approach data identified with these undertakings. 
  • Public Highway ventures and inland water squander ventures. 
  • Projects up to one lakh 50,000 square meters. 

The projects that are recorded under the B2 classification require scarcely the two-stage cycle to conclude whether to allow or dismiss the proposition. 

As indicated by the draft, just government authorities, delegates, and project defenders are permitted to report the infringement. This clause has removed the privilege of individuals to report an infringement, which in the past has caused significantly to prevent enterprises and specialists from going excessively far inconsistency with misuse.

Ex-post facto clearance is not a new term, as it has been an evading practice often manipulated to entertain illegal or corrupted activities. While the current law states that projects to obtain environmental clearance prior to any commencement of the activity, this new insertion of ‘Ex-post facto clearance’ provides an exception that violates the requirement of mandatory clearance. 

Detailing on ‘ease of doing business’ and Constitutional duties

The whole point of the EIA draft 2020 is the way out on how not to do an environmental impact assessment. The emphasis is on getting environmental clearance and assent. India is under a global commitment to conduct EIA(s). It is a scientific, legitimate, and social apparatus to evaluate the conceivable ecological results of proposed projects. The draft EIA warning has three fundamental destinations: firstly, to guarantee that most environmentally damaging consequences do not need an EIA; secondly, make wide special exceptional cases for EIAs, for example, higher thresholds; thirdly, guarantee that those (ventures) that require EIAs are not examined by either people in general or concerned authorities. There is no proof that every one of these provisions will help accomplish the financial position. The straightforward explanation is that significantly under the current EIA 2006 system, no project is ever dismissed. The ministry of environment’s history is 100% approved for all activities. 

The rundown of businesses permitted to start ventures without EIA clearance incorporates probably the most perilous and high effect enterprises, for example, creation of synthetics and acids, concrete plants, oil exploration, stream valley projects and mining, among others. It additionally expresses that huge solar-based parks, safeguard ventures and mechanical domains do not need to go through any EIA procedural cycle under the pretext of ‘national interest’.

The proposed draft additionally expresses that red classified projects, high limit high impact projects would now be able to begin inside 5 km of secured territories and environmentally delicate regions, which was prior confined to a 10km radius area. 

Common Society participation and citizen engagement in Environment Impact Assessment measure have been considered incredibly pivotal in environmental administration and democratic government. Nevertheless, the basic apparatus of public discussion has been pulled back from practically all categories of polluting and high impact undertaking projects. Aside from taking them off the pre-project consultation procedure, they have additionally been denied any part in taking the perception of any violation or raising a voice against a pollution-risky and violating industry.

The draft additionally expresses that in the event of specific undertakings that actually have public consultation norms applicable, just material ecological concerns can be shared, no other connected social effect or long-term wellbeing concerns. The SC decided in Rural Litigation & Entitlement vs. State of U.P that Article 21 of the Constitution states that no individual will be denied of his life or personal liberty in a 1983 stoppage of limestone mining in Doon Valley. Necessitates that when commercial activities obliterate environments and ecological processes on which life depends, commerce must stop, on the grounds that the coherence of life through the protection of the fundamental cycles of nature is a constitutional commitment. It is additionally a moral and civilisational commitment. 

Concluding remarks

Although the EIA draft 2020 was brought forth with keeping in mind ‘conditions and threshold on the undertaking of some project or expansion or modernization of such existing project’, it has clearly stated the draft imposes restrictions and limitation upon the common public and making way easier for commercial giants and industries to carry forth the projects without having to screen through regulatory and adequate procedures. 

This ‘anti-ecological’ law is backward and against the inherent constitutional right to information. In a nation where debasement and infringement of law are common, the draft is by all accounts changed and recharged to serve the personal stakes of elites by preventing the truth from getting environmental change. 

The EIA 2006 thought about assessments of individuals through open discussion before the last endorsement of an undertaking. Not exclusively did the new draft eliminate the privilege of public counsel on specific exercises yet additionally abbreviate the 30 days’ notice period for hearing and handling reactions to 20 days. 

The legislature has created a false fantasy that environmental laws are an obstacle to economic development, and the vast majority, including the courts, cheerfully have confidence in this so-called myth. More or less, the EIA Draft 2020 is not only mistaken at certain levels, yet in reality, it consists of a summary of all potential infringement one could envision vis-á-vis environmental administration in the nation. The simplicity of working together cannot just rule over worries of public wellbeing and environmental concerns.

The EIA draft 2020, once executed, would prompt a generous increment in deforestation, illegal mining, and development exercises in earth weak territories and left with no opportunity for individuals or activists to report the infringement. In fact, these are the occasions wherein governments ought to increase the environmental-conscious rules and guidelines for a safer, better tomorrow.

Marital Rape in India: The Public/Private Dichotomy

[This is a post by Panya Mathur, Contributing Member]

[Editorial Note: Constitutional Renaissance Blog would like to thank Ms Bansari Kamdar for having an insightful discussion on ‘Marital Rape Laws’ in India. Reach out to Ms Kamdar here.]

In India, there exists a complex conundrum in relation to the vast number of issues surrounding the criminalisation of marital rape. There has been a great measure of sanctity involved with marriage. Marriage is seen as a sacrament, a union of two souls, who will remain in complete exclusivity to one another for all purposes in their lifetime. This can be proved by the existence of personal laws in the country. For instance, the institution of marriage in the Hindu community occupies a prime role in the social construct of a Hindu. The concept of consent in the sexual relationship in a marriage is dicey and difficult to navigate. A marriage rests on the concepts of a moral cement that produces ‘two-in-one-ship’. 

The exception to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity IPC) states as follows:

“Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
And the Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:

“Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether under a decree of separation or otherwise, without her consent, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 

The notion of the Marital Rape exception can be traced as far back as 1736 when Sir Matthew Hales declared that ‘the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which cannot retract.’  

The horrors of Harvender Kaur

In the case of Harvender Kaur v. Harmender Singh Choudhary, the Court did not hesitate to opine that “the introduction of constitutional law in the home is most inappropriate. It is like introducing a bull in a china shop and that neither Article 21 nor Article 14 had any place in the privacy of the home. In a sensitive sphere which is at once most intimate and delicate, the introduction of the cold principles of constitutional law will have the effect of weakening the marriage bond”. In the case of Smt. Saroja Rani vs. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, the bench judge explicitly agrees to the judgement given in the Harvinder Kaur Case, hoisting the requirement of the existence of a private sphere wherein the law does not seek a stance, in order to preserve the moral fabric and sanctity of the society. 

However, what has been conveniently ignored by the Hon’ble Court is that in both conditions of rape and marital rape the primary definition of rape remains a constant that is sexual penetration or intercourse wherein there exists a lack of consent. Therefore, to prove that the crime of rape has occurred, it is essential to prove the absence of unequivocal consent. Moreover, the burden to prove this absence of consent usually rests on the victim; however, in certain cases such as that in the case of minors, it is presumed that consent does not exist due to the presumption created in law that such minors are incapable of providing consent to any sexual acts. Similarly, in the case where the victim and perpetrator are in a marital relationship, there is a presumption of consent on the part of the wife even when such equivocal consent required by Section 375 is not present. The same can be proved by the mere existence of the exception to Section 375 of I P C.  Moreover, the State has selectively penetrated into this marital sphere by enacting legislation that deals with the violence of women in matrimonial homes. PWDVA, 2005 and Section 498A of the IPC provides a remedy for women who are victims of forms of abuse in the marital sphere. Hence, to empower women and protect them from violence in a domestic relationship, the State should rightfully criminalize marital rape break down the public/private dichotomy. The Supreme Court in the case of Independent Thought v. Union of India, partly struck down a part of the exception clause in section 375 citing it to be in violation of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and in violation of a child’s fundamental rights. The court notes that marriage cannot be the sole reason for any reasonable differentiation for girls between the ages of 15-18 years. In doing so the court explicitly made note of the fact that marriage cannot be reasonable classification. Even though the court keenly observed that the judgment did not speak of adult marital rape it is important to note that the court held a woman’s right cannot be subservient to her personal rights simply on basis of marriage.

In the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. K. Shyam Sundar, the Court has held that whenever there is express arbitrariness that exists in law or State action, irrespective of whether it was legislative or not, Article 14 immediately springs into action, and the said action is struck down. Moreover, the term ‘arbitrary’ means an act that has been done in a manner that is unreasonable, and has been done at pleasure and has been done in a capricious manner without any determining principle, not founded on the nature of things, is non-rational and does not have a standard functioning principle. In order to find out that an act is arbitrary, there must be proof of ‘substantive unreasonableness’ and in the said circumstance, the test of reasonable differentia has not been complied with, because the purpose of criminal laws prohibiting rape or indeed any kind of physical violence or unwanted touching is to maintain a person’s bodily integrity. 

Conclusion

However, it must be noted that there are numerous other legislations that protect the rights of married women which have been provided by the Legislature. One cannot look at the exception to rape in isolation, and state that the rights of married women have been deprived. The overall position is that the husband can still be liable for domestic violence or cruelty under the IPC and other specific legislation. Spousal rape should be viewed as an abuse of the marriage relationship, with some protection being deemed necessary for the abused spouse. The State provides protection for the same under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as well as the Section 498A of Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the marital sphere does not rest on the pillars of contracts sealed with permanent terms and conditions that must be maintained to continue the relationship. Neither does the concept of marriage exist on the tenets of Constitutional Law to enforce inalienable rights into a relationship of such sanctity. Thus, it can be concluded that there exists a lack of protection that exists when it comes to the rights of married women in the country. And this lacunae in the law should either be resolved by removing the exception 2 of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, that excludes married women from the purview of its protection, or by extending the purview of Section 498A and other such laws. 

A Conservative Amendment in a Liberal Constitution: The First Amendment

[Editorial Note: The author would like to thank Tripurdaman Singh for his book Sixteen Stormy Days: The Story of the First Amendment of the Constitution of India and Amit Varma for a wonderful discussion on his podcast Seen and the Unseen]

It was the year 1951 and the Supreme Court had passed two judgments, Brij Bhushan v. the State of Delhi and Romesh Thapar v. the State of Madras, upholding the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under the Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution. It was before the First Constitutional Amendment when the Constitution was considered to be ‘fairly liberal’ as the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 were not subject to so many restrictions as we see today. Restrictions were there in the original Constitution as well, no doubt, as they are necessary. Then, the freedoms were the rights and the restrictions were the exceptions to those rights. But what followed after these two judgments was an act of Parliament (more of Nehru’s) which turned the freedoms into (somewhat) exceptions.

The First Constitutional Amendment, 1951

It has to be kept in mind that the first amendment was discussed and passed by the provisional parliament which did not have a ‘popular mandate’. It was the provisional Parliament’s members who framed the Constitution but they were not the constituent assembly. But for Nehru, it did not make any difference, as he said in the assembly:

“Now, that Constituent Assembly which has gone into the history of India is no more; but we who sit here, or nearly all of us, still continue that tradition, that link. In fact, it is we after all, who was the Constituent Assembly and who drafted this Constitution. Then we were not supposed to be competent enough to draft the Constitution. But now, the work we did was so perfect that we are not now competent enough to touch it! That is rather an odd argument.” 

He was right somehow, they were not competent to amend the Constitution as they did not have any popular mandate and this amendment could have waited till the elections. But it was nothing, but sixty stormy days of debates, discussion and dictatorial behaviour! Before the amendment, Article 19(2) read as:

“(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevents the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.”

It did not have any ‘reasonable restriction’ clause in it. But the restrictions were not so much. After the amendment, clause 2 of Article 19 read as follows:

“(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

This means that parliament can frame a ‘law’ which can restrict the freedom of speech and expression if that law is in furtherance of the restrictions given thereunder. Restrictions like public order or incitement to an offence are vague and can create a long-lasting chilling effect and they are, even now. Suppose, there is a rally in protest against any law passed by the state, then the state can restrict that protest and say it violates the public order, hence, citizens cannot exercise their right to speak against the government and they can invoke the draconian section 124A (Sedition) of IPC, 1860 [which is an offence under a law made by the state].

The Reasons for Amendment and the Opposing Views

In the cases of Brij Bhusan and Romesh Thapar, the government attempted to curb the freedom of the press and the right to free speech and expression. But the Court struck down that imposed restraint on civil liberties. When the question of interpretation of Article 19 came up, the Supreme Court held that if the maintenance of public, order or securing the public safety was something which did not affect the security of the State or the overthrowing of the State, then there could be no restriction on freedom of speech. The amendment was being made to overrule these judgments [hence, the words public order etc. were added], but PM Nehru said ingeniously in the assembly as he said: “We are not putting down any kind of curb or restraint. We are removing certain doubts so as to enable Parliament to function if it so chooses and when it chooses. Nothing else happens when this Bill is passed except to clarify the authority of Parliament.” These amendments have chilling effects till now. We still see so many violations of civil rights in the name of these so-called restrictions.

Nehru’s vision of freedom was more conservative (and not so liberal) as a Prime Minister than as a leader of the Congress party during the freedom struggle. According to him, the freedom of speech ‘carries with itself responsibilities and obligations’ and if they are not performed, then there would be no freedom. This goes against liberal thought.

The Parliament and the government could have dealt with the problems of public order or incitement of offence through preventive detention laws. Now, supposing there are persons who are preaching murder and who are doing, something of that character, supposing there is some newspaper which is doing something of that character and the writer is there, the individual can be secured under the Preventive Detention Act. So, if the Parliament or the Government want to prevent a person or group of persons from committing acts which they consider to be against the interests of public order, then they are already clothed with sufficient authority to do so.

The amendment does not bear any fruit, except increasing the power of the government. Another restriction which is placed is the restriction on criticism or speech on ‘friendly relations with other states’. On this Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, who I feel is a text-book example of a classic liberal during the debates, said: “I have not been able to find any precedent in any part of the civilised world whereby law under the provisions of the Constitution criticism of foreign powers is taboo.

He cast doubts on the meaning of ‘friendly relations with other states’, as he said: “we may say anything about a foreign country with the utmost friendship in our hearts but if that country misunderstands and says that it offends it or it affects our friendly relations with them, you are at once bound by the provisions of the Constitution.” If the government today passes any law in furtherance of these restrictions, then anything can be restricted and the civil liberties and freedoms will merely become exceptions.

The fears apprehended by Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee are now re-surfacing back in 2020 as we witness internet shutdown(s) in Kashmir using Section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code, use of draconian laws like National Security Act and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) to curb Freedom of Speech and Expression among other violations. We see these violations of free speech and civil liberties and the reason (not the sole reason though) behind such regressive measures is this hurried, hasty and (“unconstitutional”) First Constitutional Amendment Act. PM Nehru, despite his charismatic leadership and vision, did put the Constitution and civil liberties in danger.

In conclusion, let us revisit the prophetic warning given by Dr Mukherjee and try to draw parallels in contemporary times:

“Maybe you [Nehru] will continue for eternity, in the next generation, for generations unborn; that is quite possible. But supposing some other party comes into authority? What is the precedent you are laying down?

The fears imagined by Mukherjee in 1951 still haunts us today!

Guest Post: Analyzing the Scope of Voluntary Forfeiture of Political Party Membership

[This is a guest post by Rohan Bhatnagar]

The Anti Defection Law under the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution ensures that legislators maintain their allegiance towards their respective political factions. This article precisely analyzes the reasons behind members voluntarily forfeiting their party’s membership and provides solutions for curbing the same.

Introduction

Defection lures the Members of the Legislature to secure powerful berths. It is used as a bait for obtaining their services. Defection weakens the Opposition and India’s democratic foundations. The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution specifies voluntary forfeiture of a political party’s membership as a basis for disqualifying a Member of the Legislature. The author purports to provide precise analysis and solutions regarding the issue in this article.

Analyzing Statutory Provisions to determine Voluntary Forfeiture of Party Membership

Paragraph 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule stipulates voluntary forfeiture of political party membership as a ground for defection. According to this provision:

“2. Disqualification on ground of defection— (1) Subject to the provisions of [paragraphs 4 and 5], a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House—

(a) If he has voluntarily given up his membership of such a political party. ”

The provision necessitates that members must adopt the principles of political dignity and morality for prohibiting defection within the Legislature. Diligently adhering to these principles preserves the Legislature’s reputation. Further, it affirms allegiance to one’s political affiliation. 

The expression ‘voluntarily gives up membership’ is wider than the term ‘resignation’. A member may forfeit his party membership expressly or impliedly. It is discernible through his conduct. It must be authentic and must not be made under coercion. It becomes effective upon the occurrence of such an event. 

Rival parties entice members into assessing and affirming considerations such as ministerial berths. Factors including offering pecuniary benefits, differences in ideological and policy-related affairs and a party’s functioning style constitute defections.

The Tenth Schedule also includes splits outside the floor of the House within its purview. When members form a separate faction within the same political party by voluntarily forfeiting its membership, it attracts disqualification proceedings. 

In Rajasthan, several members of the State Legislature allegedly visited Delhi to collude with the opposing faction. The Speaker disqualified them for attempting to topple the State Government. Similarly, in Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka, legislators voluntarily resigned and defected to the opposing faction, inviting disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. 

The onus of proving lies on the person alleging that such a faction created a split in the original party. The test is a split involving one third party member. The time for engineering such a split is immaterial. A floor test determines public confidence in a party’s leadership. 

Article 191 (1) disqualifies members under any one of the following heads, namely, “being chosen as” a member or for “being a member” of the House. Article 191 (2), on the other hand, uses the phrase “for being a member of the House”. Thus Article 191 (2) and Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule employ the same language.  

It implies that disqualification under the Tenth Schedule differs from the other categories enunciated under Article 191 (1). Members are not barred from consequently contesting elections, thus avoiding subsequent prohibition from becoming members of the Legislature. Further, Section 36 (2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 empowers the Returning Officer to reject a candidate’s nomination. 

The Speaker or the Chairman acts as a Tribunal in disqualification proceedings. He must act in a quasi-judicial capacity for determining the question. His decision must be based on objective facts. The 33rd Constitutional Amendment mandates that the Speaker must accept a member’s resignation. 

Thus members cannot resign unilaterally. He inquires about the resignation’s genuineness upon its receipt. ‘Genuineness’ refers to its authenticity and the members’ personal choice to resign. It may be rejected if forged or made under coercion. However, the Courts may review his decision.

The Court’s scope for judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 respectively is confined to the grounds of mala fides, violation of constitutional mandate, perversity in the Speaker’s decision and non-compliance with the principles of natural justice.  

Consequently, it bars members from using privileges such as the right of publishing proceedings and its prohibition, the right of excluding strangers, disciplinary powers, the power for punishing for contempt and regulating internal proceedings if found guilty of defection. 

Other Provisions

  • The Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B bar any person who is disqualified under the Tenth Schedule from being appointed as a Minister or from holding any political post from the date of disqualification till the date of expiry of his office term or his date of re-election to the legislature, whichever is earlier. 
  • The Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section 9(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 mentions disloyalty to the State as a ground for disqualification. Such a Member may be disqualified for 5 years from the date of disqualification. 
  • The Members of Rajya Sabha (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985: Rule 3(a) of the Rules stipulates that the ruling party’s leader must submit a written statement listing the names and particulars of his party members. Rule 4(2) states that Members must furnish information concerning their particulars as required by Form-III before the Secretary-General of the House. 
  • The Members of Lok Sabha (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985: Rule 10 and Rule 11 are framed on identical lines as Rules 3(a) and 4(2) of the Rajya Sabha Disqualification Rules, requiring the Ruling Party’s leader to submit a written statement listing the names and particulars of his party members. Further, the members shall also furnish information concerning their particulars before the Secretary-General of the House.

Using Judicial Precedents for analyzing the Scope of Voluntary Forfeiture of Party Membership

Scope of the Tenth Schedule

In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, the Supreme Court observed the role of political parties in the electoral process and remarked that the Tenth Schedule must exist to avoid tarnishing the society’s conscience and moral fabric. The Court further observed that Paragraph 2 (1) (a) of the Schedule provided for equal application of the principles of political propriety and morality across the vast spectrum of the Legislature. 

Thus, members of the Legislature must be prohibited from defecting to restore public faith in the electoral process. The Court also struck down Paragraph 7 which barred the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate matters concerning disqualification of members.

The 52nd Constitutional (Amendment) Act’s purpose was ensuring that Members of the Legislature do not change their sides easily, since these acts are capable of destabilizing the system. Explanation (a) to Paragraph 2 (1) creates a deeming fiction. Courts assume a grave situation and consider that such material facts exist. They pronounce their judgment accordingly. Fully enforcing it ensures that the defecting member cannot circumvent the legal provisions. 

Preserving Freedom of Speech and Expression

The Court in Kihoto Hollohan’s case observed that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule neither violated the freedom of speech and expression nor infringed the Parliamentary and the State Legislature proceedings stipulated under Articles 105 and 194.

The scope of the expression ‘Voluntarily Given Up Membership’ 

The term ‘voluntary’ implies that the resignation is not based on threat, force or coercion. The scope of the expression ‘voluntarily given up membership’ was examined in Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India & Ors. The Court observed that ‘voluntarily giving up membership’ cannot be equated with ‘resignation’. It has a wider connotation. Further, a member’s conduct sufficiently infers that he has voluntarily forfeited his party’ membership. 

In G. Viswanathan vs. The Hon’ble Speaker Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, where members of the Legislature met the Governor and submitted him a letter requesting him to dissolve the Assembly, it invited disqualification under Paragraph 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule. It was held that voluntarily giving up party membership may be express or implied. The essential condition is a member joining an opposing political faction. 

Separate Factions within the same party and Coalition Governments 

Members can be disqualified under Paragraph 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule if separate factions exist within the same political party. The time gap of such a split is immaterial. It may occur through unilateral severance or detachment from party links. However, the provision is inapplicable where a member having a different political affiliation withdraws his support to the Chief Minister in a coalition government. Its rationale is that their allegiance lies to the people and not towards members of a particular political party. 

Conclusion

Defection is a social evil striking at the foundation of the Indian democracy. It is anti-democratic and corrupt as it involves only a personal gain and not a conscientious change of heart of the legislator. Political parties must lead the way in ethical governance by not indulging such practices. Defecting members should be eternally barred from contesting elections. Intraparty splits must also be prohibited. Further, the Election Commission’s opinion in disqualification proceedings as a sine qua non in disqualification proceedings before the President or the Governor advert to their final decision restores public faith in the electoral mechanism.